

**DIASPORAS, COSMOPOLITANISM AND POST-TERRITORIAL  
CITIZENSHIP**

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*Introduction*

Citizenship has undergone dramatic changes over the past forty years. The conception and practice of citizenship based on mutually exclusive, territorial homogeneous states has come under severe attack. Contrary to the wishes of states, codified in international agreements in the 1930s, and reaffirmed until the European Convention on Nationality of 1997, dual citizenship has been sharply on the rise. Amid a sample of 15 countries, fewer than 5% allowed dual citizenship in 1959; this figure is now about 50% (Sejersen 2008: 531). According to a larger study in 2009, out of 189 countries, only 53 (28%) did not accept any form of dual citizenship (Blatter, Erdmann, and Schwanke 2009: 10). This phenomenon is only one of the indicators of the progressive institutionalisation of transnational communities, diasporas, or what could be broadly defined as transnational forms of identification and belonging. From the standpoint of citizenship, there is increasing evidence that citizenries are more and

more overlapping, ever less constrained by state-defined territorial limits.

These developments do not go without questioning some of the most fundamental assumptions of the Westphalian project of the territorial state, and in many regards of the liberal theory of representative politics that is associated with it. More precisely, transformations such as the tolerance towards dual citizenship, the possibility of obtaining citizenship abroad, or voting and being represented as a constituency abroad challenge the traditional assumptions of a match between identities, borders and social and political orders (Albert, Jacobson, and Lapid 2001). They assume and enact the conception that the ‘domestic is not necessarily within the borders of the nation state, but can in fact be a ‘domestic abroad’ (Varadarajan 2010).

What is the meaning of these transformations, and what have been the main interpretations of it? Over the past twenty years, ‘globalization’ as a distinct economic and social phenomenon, has carried with it the hopes of a political order that would overcome the traditional frontiers of the nation-state. The end of the Cold War has in particular generated a renewed interest in ideas of cosmopolitanism and brought into existence a vibrant interdisciplinary field of study concerned precisely with the possibility of thinking citizenship beyond the territorial state. And so it is not surprising that it is predominantly within this framework that diaspora policies have been interpreted.

The aim of this chapter is however to question this optimistic reading of diaspora

policies. I will contend that if cosmopolitanists are right in finding in these developments the emergence of political spaces beyond the territorial state, it is however a fundamental mistake to conflate them with manifestations of progressive or cosmopolitan politics. It is indeed important to distinguish the post-territorial nature of diasporic practices of citizenship – what I term post-territorial citizenship – with the misleading, normatively charged assumption that they are necessarily a form of cosmopolitan resistance to an exclusionary or repressive order. In fact, most of the time, the opposite is true: diasporic citizenship has been ethnicized from the onset and has gone hand in hand with exclusionary practices of citizenship towards non-ethnics on the territory, organizing what Igor Štiks and I have defined as the ‘ethnic engineering of citizenship’ (Ragazzi and Štiks 2009).

I develop in this chapter a double argument. I claim that after a historical period of intense territorial securitisation of citizenship, which has forced both immigration and emigration states in a territorial straightjacket, the current developments have not meant a desecuritisation of migrant citizens, or the advancement of post-national/cosmopolitan values, but the opposite. The current evolution of citizenship has to be understood as a progressive bifurcation of the logics of managing migration, between immigration and emigration logics. In terms of immigration – and despite the current political discourse on the supposed demise of multiculturalism (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010) – immigrants are ever less required to assimilate in order to gain access to denizenship or citizenship. This however does not mean they are less subject to practices of control and surveillance. The imperative of mobility and

the management through community are two of the contemporary faces of neoliberal government through risk<sup>1</sup>. What has more rarely been analysed in the literature however, is the other side of citizenship practices in relation to migration; and the constitutive relationship between immigration and emigration contexts for the shaping of contemporary citizenship<sup>2</sup>. In emigration contexts, indeed, the loosening of the straightjacket has meant the appearance of what could be defined as forms of post-territorial citizenship: policies of diaspora inclusion or “global nations” premised on a de-territorialised, ethnic conception of citizenship, and a novel exclusion of unwanted territorialised ethnic groups.

### *Cosmopolitan, post-national or post-territorial citizenship?*

Why are governmental enactments of diasporic citizenship – i.e. practices of extending civic, social and political citizenship rights to populations abroad – not necessarily markers of cosmopolitan citizenship? At first sight, diasporic citizenship seems to have many affinities with cosmopolitan citizenship. As Andrew Linklater argues, the cosmopolitan conception of citizenship stands against ‘traditional perspectives [which] maintain that modern conceptions of citizenship are anchored in the world of the bounded community; [which] contend that it loses its precise meaning when divorced from territoriality, sovereignty and shared nationality’ (Linklater 1998: 22). It puts forward a

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<sup>1</sup> (Hindess 2002, 2004; Isin 2004; Nyers 2003; Walters 2002)

<sup>2</sup> Important exceptions are, among others (Guillaume 2007; Hindess 2001; Isin 1999; Koslowski 2005; Spiro 1997)

notion of citizenship that takes into account the changes brought about by the flows of people, capital and ideas that cross national boundaries at an increasing pace and therefore posits a global sense of entitlement and responsibility that is not and should be bound by the territorial borders of the state (Linklater 1998: 23). In this framework, migrants and diasporas are the primary political subject of cosmopolitan change and hybridization (Appiah 2006; Gilroy 1994). In the normative opposition between a closed, exclusionary nation state and an emancipatory transnational alternative, diasporas are the ontological contenders, the cosmopolitan challengers of the nation state (Appadurai 1991).

And so, rather unsurprisingly, cosmopolitanists have located state-backed diaspora policies in this framework. As Seyla Benhabib puts it:

today nation-states encourage diasporic politics among their migrants and ex-citizens, seeing in the diaspora not only a source of political support for projects at home, but also a resource of networks, skills and competencies that can be used to enhance a state's own standing in an increasingly global world. [...] (Benhabib 2007: 24)

Transnational migrations, Benhabib explains, foreground the 'pluralization of sites of sovereignty' in that diasporas live across multiple legal systems and jurisdictions, under the protection of cosmopolitan norms enforced by human rights treaties – and in struggle with a system of state sovereignty which privileges national citizenship and restricts dual and multiple citizenship (Benhabib 2007: 24). Hence diaspora policies support the 'cosmopolitan argument', namely that:

world citizenship can be a powerful means of coaxing citizens away from the false supposition that the interests of fellow citizens necessarily take priority over duties to the rest of the human race; it is a unique device for eliciting their support for global political institutions and sentiments which weaken the grip of exclusionary separate states. (Linklater 1998: 22)

Aihwa Ong has already produced an extensive critique of the ‘innocent concept of the essential diasporan subject, one that celebrates hybridity, “cultural” border crossing, and the production of difference in the work of Gilroy, Hall, Clifford and Bhabha’ (Ong 2000: 13). I will therefore not rehearse it here. The main issue I take with existing explanations is what we could define as the spectrum of ‘methodological *post-nationalism*’.<sup>3</sup> The ‘post-national’ argument has been popularized, among others, by the work of Yasemin Soysal.<sup>4</sup> Soysal argues that migrants and diasporas increasingly escape the statist conception of the nation through subnational, supranational or transnational forms of belonging, anchoring their rights as citizens no longer in the institutions of the state, but through forms of ‘universal personhood’ embedded in novel human rights norms and treaties which came to force after World War II. In doing so, they are ‘post-national’, and therefore cosmopolitan.

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<sup>3</sup> This play on words has also been used by Cauvet (2011).

<sup>4</sup> For variations on the concept of postnationalism, see Habermas (2001) Jacobson (1996). For a different take on postnationalism, see the concept of “denationalization” as developed by Bosniak (2000) and Sassen (Sassen 2006).

By ‘methodological *post*-nationalism’ I therefore want to suggest, as the proponents of ‘methodological nationalism’ do,<sup>5</sup> that much of the literature on citizenship and diaspora politics has been permeated by an untold, unconscious set of normative and methodological assumptions that need to be made explicit in order to be overcome.

The first problematic assumption lies in the conflation of the ‘national’ with the territorial’. All that is ‘national’ – and therefore nationalism – can only be territorial. Anything that goes beyond the territory is therefore, to the opposite, *post-national*. Thus, transnational practices are interpreted as necessarily undermining the logic of nationalism and its exclusionary effects – and therefore a sign of resistance or cosmopolitanism. The second problematic assumption is that state power is exclusively territorial. Processes that go beyond the territoriality of the state are assumed to somewhat escape its power – and therefore solely ruled by individual (ethical) or global (human rights) norms. The conflation of the nation and territory on the one hand and state and territory on the other paradoxically reproduce, in reverse, the ontological bias of methodological nationalist social science. Mine is therefore not a statist critique of post-nationalism, but a critique of the core assumption of the territorial boundedness of governmental power in explaining the attention of governments to their populations abroad.

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<sup>5</sup> “Methodological nationalism” has been developed as a concept to argue that most of the contemporary social science has, from Weber and Durkheim up until recent years, taken for granted the ideas that “societies” are almost naturally contained by the territorial boundaries of the state, and hence has been blind to social and political processes taking place at the interstice of these frontiers, or simply beyond them. For an in-depth study of the literature of methodological nationalism, see Chernilo (2006).

What is the alternative? Elsewhere, I have proposed to look at diaspora policies as a shift in the geography of the practices of governmental power (Ragazzi 2009), by drawing on a large literature in sociology (Hindess 2001; Sassen 2006), political geography (Agnew 1994) and international relations (Bigo and Walker 2007; Ruggie 1993), which has now shown that the state is neither resisting nor being undermined by processes of transnationalization. It is in fact becoming transnational itself. And while a subfield of diaspora studies now acknowledges the importance of diaspora policies and emigrant citizenship, only a few locate them in a process of transnationalization state practices<sup>6</sup>.

Building on the work of this latter group of scholars, I suggest to conceptualize state practices of extending citizenship to its citizens beyond the traditional borders of the nation state, forsaking territorial criteria of belonging – such as birth or residence – as practices of ‘post-territorial citizenship.’ In my understanding, post-territorial citizenship is therefore not a handy synonym of post-national citizenship – as have most authors who have used the term so far – but as a term that undermines its very assumptions.<sup>7</sup> The characteristic of this new form of post-territorial citizenship is indeed to abandon the territorial referent as the main criteria for inclusion and exclusion from citizenship, focusing instead on ethno-cultural markers of identity, irrespective of the place of residence. Post-territorial citizenship is hence closely linked to, and partly overlaps with,

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<sup>6</sup> See Gamlen (2008) for a good overview of this literature.

<sup>7</sup> In most of the literature on citizenship and cosmopolitanism, post-national and post-territorial citizenship are used interchangeably. See for example Squire (2009) and from a standpoint critical of the concept, Chandler (2009, 2007) Pugh (2007:107) and Baker (2007). My goal here is to carve out a different understanding of the term.

what Riva Kastoryano (2007) and Nina Glick Schiller (1999), among others, have defined as transnational forms of nationalism.

This paper will argue that as a historical phenomenon, post-territorial citizenship is not new, to the opposite, the taken for granted territorialization of citizenship is only a brief historical period<sup>8</sup> In the first section, I show that while states did enact early forms of post-territorial citizenship in the late 19th century, they met repeatedly with two strong territorializing processes. First since the Bancroft treaties of the 1860s, and the European Convention on nationalities up to 1997, international agreements actively discouraged dual nationality, the sources of which were precisely practices of post-territorial citizenship. Second, for the most part of this period, even when the nation was conceived in ethnic terms, such as in Italy, Germany, or Israel, the political goal up until the past few years, was always to ‘territorialize’ it or ‘populate the land’. The nationalities of the Soviet Union, even if conceived in ethnic terms, also had to be territorialized in order to be recognized as such.<sup>9</sup> In the second section, I show that throughout the 20th century, whether civic or ethnic, nations were therefore *territorialized*, and the resolution of issues linked to national heterogeneity of citizenship were perceived as a security threat to the cohesion and survival of the nation or the “race”.<sup>10</sup> It has led to the enforcement of the principle of mutually exclusive, homogeneous citizenries on territorially defined states. Finally, in the third section, I show how the evolution in the contemporary rationality and

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<sup>8</sup> I would like to thank Guido Tintori for highlighting the importance of this point. For more on this see

<sup>9</sup> See the history of Jewish autonomous region Birobidhzan in Levin (1990)

<sup>10</sup> What has been debated in critical security studies under the label « societal security » (Roe 2005; Wæver 1993)

practices of government have brought about a bifurcation between immigration and emigration contexts in the relation between citizenship and security: in the former context it is progressively becoming one element among others for the management of populations; in the latter it is becoming the technology of choice to enforce forms of what I term as post-territorial citizenship.

### *From perpetual allegiance to territorial citizenship*

Thinking of these practices as post-territorial allows two conceptual moves. First, it allows a move from a topology of levels (the sub-national, the national, the global) to a topology of transnational, overlapping social spaces (Faist 2004). Practices that cross territorial boundaries create a transnational site of contestation – and therefore politics – and there is certainly no ontological necessity for these practices to be invested in a particular normative position. Second, this space is not a separate, free-floating space of ideas and cosmopolitan norms, but to the contrary a space saturated with a multitude of relations of power, legislative systems and bureaucratic routines in which several actors – governments, associations, individuals – are in permanent competition for a material and symbolic definition of the included and the excluded. Analyzing enactments of citizenship as post-territorial therefore allows an exploration of the way in which these enactments of citizenship open or close down these political spaces.

If we consider the emergence of modern citizenship as resulting from the development of an international society of states in Western Europe roughly around and after the

peace of Westphalia,<sup>11</sup> the first logic of citizenship that comes to the fore is the one in which state sovereignty is the ultimate concern, not citizens nor populations themselves. Michel Foucault showed how the practice of power had to be relocated within the broader taken-for-granted assumptions of the time. More precisely, Foucault showed how mercantilism – the economic doctrine of the time, in appearance limited to economic matters – was more than an economic doctrine but a specific program of government focused on monetary accumulation and population growth destined at strengthening the power of the sovereign. It carried with it many assumptions about how a state should be ruled. In this perspective, the loss of subjects-citizens was equated with the loss of power for the sovereign in its competition with other powers (Foucault 2004: 7).

Grounded in natural law and encoded in English common law, the principle of perpetual allegiance between the sovereign and its citizens is, throughout feudal Europe, what best illustrates the practice shared by European states. Subjects-citizens had no control over their citizenship; they needed to obtain the consent of the sovereign to renounce it (Legomsky 2003: 109; Spiro 1997: 1419). The sovereign-subject relationship was understood as “the one of parent and child: a product of nature, hence indissoluble” (Spiro 1997: 1417). It is around this principle that most of the international citizenship battles will be played out until the end of the

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<sup>11</sup> The peace of Westphalia (1648) serves in this regard more as a symbolic and conceptual reference than an historical and linear starting point, as often assumed in most the international relations literature. For a critique, see Osiander (2001)

first half of the 20th century.

Throughout most of the 19th century, the freedom to decide one's citizenship waxed and waned according to the political circumstances and more often than not to military preoccupations. France for example, with the 1803 civil code, was among the first states to give citizens the freedom to move abroad and acquire a foreign citizenship.<sup>12</sup> At the eve of the war with Austria, Napoleon, however, overturned the provision and required even those who had already naturalised (acquired a new citizenship) in another state to come back. On 26 August 1811, it became illegal to acquire foreign nationality without the permission of the Emperor (Weil, Spire, and Bertossi 2010: 7). In 1889, this again became possible, except for men in age of military service, who had to ask permission (Weil, Spire, and Bertossi 2010: 7).

In many states, adhering to notions of perpetual allegiance, naturalisation (the acquisition of another citizenship) was perceived not such much as an act of treason, but rather as a direct offence to the sovereign. The most telling example of the tension between perpetual allegiance and the new individual freedoms is, in the Anglo-Saxon context, the British policy of forced enrolment (*impressement*) of US-naturalised subjects of British origins into its Navy, one of the factors that led to the War of 1812. The prince regent captured the view of the time when stating that “there is no right more clearly established than the right which a sovereign has to the allegiance of his subjects, more especially in time of war. Their allegiance is no optional duty, which

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<sup>12</sup> This, in return, entailed the loss of French citizenship (Weil, Spire, and Bertossi 2010: 6).

they can decline and resume at pleasure. It is a call which they are bound to obey; it began with their birth and can only terminate with their existence” (Feldman and Baldwin 2007). Similar measures existed in Turkey or in China, where as of 1815 expatriation was punished with death and banishment of the entire family (Spiro 1997: 1420). Throughout the 19th century, the conflict continued between new immigration states, such as the United States, Argentina, Australia or Brazil,<sup>13</sup> which pushed for the release from previous citizenship of their new citizens, and which most (emigration) European states denied, or severely restricted the right of expatriation, facilitating at the same time re-naturalisation.

As a reaction to the increased outflow of their population and the naturalisation of their citizens in immigration countries, emigration states composed with the ambiguities of citizenship laws and relaxed in practice the requirement of exclusive citizenship. Pre-WWI Italy, for example, gave priority to article four of the 1865 code (*ius sanguinis* for children born abroad) over article 11 which did not allow dual citizenship, creating *de facto* an important number of dual nationals (Tintori 2009: 746). Similarly, the 1913 German citizenship law replaced previous provisions of citizenship loss based on residence and allowed for the preservation or reacquisition of German citizenship regardless of naturalisation (Brubaker 1992: 115). A similar trend was found in several other states across Europe and in the world, the result being an

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<sup>13</sup> “Brazil, in particular, included in its 1891 Constitution (art. 69) automatic naturalisation of all people resident on 15 November 1889, the day on which the Republic was proclaimed. Renunciation within six months was legally allowed, but strongly discouraged by the public authorities” (Zincone and Basili 2010: 6).

exponential increase in dual citizenship. Dual nationals not only created an anomaly that did not fit the strict principles of territorial sovereignty; their progressive increase raised diplomatic tensions. Of particular concern was the military conscription of naturalised immigrants upon their return to their homelands, which happened frequently (Legomsky 2003: 89).<sup>14</sup>

Citizenship laws of emigration countries throughout the 19th century were therefore an indirect diplomatic negotiation with immigration countries over the “property” of populations, what Koslowski defines as a “tug of war” between receiving and sending states (Koslowski: 215). It was principally fought over a population conceived as the measurement of the strength of the sovereign power that had nothing to do with the point of view of the populations themselves. As Spiro puts it: “In this frame, actual sentiments of allegiance on the part of subjects were of an import equivalent to sentiments of allegiance on the part of, say, cannonballs. Expatriation represented an intolerable loss of strength to the birth sovereign, in something of a human equivalent of mercantilist paradigms” (Spiro 1997: 1422).

Over the years, the conflict, however, settled in favour of the new immigration state; and therefore generalised the freedom to chose one’s citizenship. In the US, the spark that pushed for international negotiation concerned the arrest and trial of naturalised

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<sup>14</sup> Legomski documents cases in France, Spain, Prussia and other German states, noting that even today certain citizens of such countries as Turkey, Greece or Iran might face such situations (Legomsky 2003: 89).

US citizens as British subjects in relation to the uprising in Ireland in 1868. They were denied a trial procedure reserved to aliens. Following public outrage, the US Congress passed a law<sup>15</sup> reaffirming expatriation as a fundamental right (Spiro 1997: 1428). In a series of bilateral treaties passed between the United States and countries from Old Europe known as the Bancroft Treaties, emigration states eventually recognised their citizens' right to expatriation. The conflict of migrant population's allegiance between emigration and immigration states was therefore progressively solved through bilateral agreements. Dual nationality had clearly been designated as a problem to solve, and was dealt with by the agreement that diplomatic problems created by dual citizenship would be resolved by policies of simultaneous freedom of expatriation on the emigration end and naturalisation on the immigration side.

Yet, the First World War showed the limits of the system. Despite the agreements, many states had claimed their nationals abroad. In the framework of the League of Nations-sponsored International Codification Conference, the regulation of nationality – the success of which was conceived as a solution to future conflicts – became central (Koslowski 2001: 207). The 1930 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws established that “it is in the interest of the international community to secure that all members should recognise that every person should have a nationality and should have one nationality only” (League of Nations 1930, preamble). A Protocol Relating to Military Obligations in Certain Cases of Double Nationality regulated military matters. The principal measures were to ascertain the

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<sup>15</sup> See Spiro (Spiro: 1430).

automatic expatriation of naturalised citizens, and to reinforce the principle of freedom of renunciation of one's nationality (Legomsky 2003: 92). The Bancroft treaties, along with the Hague convention, therefore marked a certain generalisation of the principle of free choice of one's citizenship, but also established the juridical framework and the symbolic encoding in international law of the principle of exclusivity of territorial citizenship, which remained mostly untouched until the last three decades.

We can therefore draw a few preliminary remarks. In the relation between immigration and emigration states, the literature often emphasises the opposition between jus sanguinis and jus solis as the main principle of tensions in regard to dual or multiple citizenship. Of course, these regulatory mechanisms played a role in the incorporation of immigrants and their involuntary preservation of citizenship as emigrants. Yet, until at the end of the 19th century the turning point is the freedom of choice of one's citizenship. This freedom is intended to suppress medieval affiliations with the former country and allow the principle of territorialized and mutually exclusive citizenship to function. Yet, through the principle of strict mutually exclusive citizenship, it is state security that is sought after and guaranteed.

### ***Territorialised citizens must be defended***

Whereas, in Foucauldian terms, the previous section has mostly been concerned with

questions pertaining to forms of sovereign rationality within which the relationship between migration, citizenship and security is articulated, the 19th century marks the progressive emergence and dominance of another rationality of government: territorially-based national homogenisation.

As Brubaker noted, “national homogenisation is not simply a political project but a social process that can occur within the institutional and territorial frame of the state even when there is no specifically nationalising political intent” (Brubaker 2009: 206). National homogenization, is directly linked to the irruption of “the people” as a source and an object of government; first, the “race” or “the nation” and, later on, “society”. Even though “the nation” and “society” quickly became sedimented to the point of becoming taken-for-granted dimensions of the conditions for governmental action, Jacques Donzelot shows how historically the question of “the social” and governing from “a social point of view” emerged from the contradictions of the democratic promises of the French Revolution of 1789.

In particular, Donzelot shows how the notion of “solidarity” and the progressive establishment of the welfare state allows for a third way between the two conflicting political economical consequences of the revolution: the state’s entire withdrawal from the question of redistribution of resources among citizens (radical liberalism) or its entire control of the redistribution of resources (Marxism as planned economy) (Donzelot 1994: 157-77). Drawing on this, Nikolas Rose argues that “the political rationalities that have played so great a part in our own century – socialism, social

democracy, social liberalism – may differ on many things, but on this they agreed: the nation must be governed, but one must pose the question of how to govern from “the social point of view”. “The social” became a kind of “a priori” of political thought: order would have to be social or it would cease to exist” (Rose 1996: 329)

In addition to the logic of exclusive citizenship described in the previous section, the idea that national *societies* were to be ethnically or culturally homogeneous on a given territory hence became the second dominant set of underpinning assumptions of much of the politics of citizenship the first half of the 20th century. The ways in which nationalism operated through citizenship to homogenise populations in immigration countries have been well studied, and it is not the purpose of this chapter to revisit it. Rather, I would like to highlight the process through which immigration and emigration countries have converged in outlining common *problems* and finding mirror-like *solutions* to ensure the national and territorial homogeneity of their states’ citizenry.

Let us first look at the ways by which migration has been conceptualised as a security problem to “the nation” of citizens. Starting at the end of the 19th century, national diversity was progressively framed as threatening two aspects of political life. First, heterogeneity on the national territory came to be considered, not without complex political struggles (see for instance Noiriel 2005: chap. 4; Shain 1999: chap. 2), as a problem of allegiance and loyalty. For immigration countries, it became the fear of the “fifth column”: the idea that certain ethnic groups, by preserving their ethno-national identities, posed a threat to national security (Cohen 1996). This is well captured in a

discussion on the French nationality law of 1889, in which Maxime Lecomte, a *député* from the north, argued that the highest danger was to “keep with us men who are not attached to any homeland (*patrie*), who do not like France, whom we did not manage to conquer, and therefore to let [...] different nations in the French nation to be created” (Noiriel 2007: 183). This fear was mirrored on the emigration side: the loyalty of those leaving or staying abroad was considered equally suspicious (Shain 1990). A second fear, characteristic of the beginning of the 20th century, was the fear of the corruption of the culture the nation, or the “race”. Through biological metaphors, only the adequacy between nation and territory came to be considered as a healthy form of political existence, the Others as pathologic and therefore threatening. Both immigration and emigration states devised solutions to these fears framed as political problems, and these all pointed to territorial, nationally homogeneous citizenries. Both problems called for responses to ensure the territorial and homogeneous existence of nations.

A first set of practices aimed at creating national homogeneity was based on the premise that migrants could become *nationalised* citizens. On the immigration states side, ethno-cultural diversity could be resolved through naturalisation and assimilation. The acquisition of citizenship therefore became progressively associated with the acquisition of national features, be it for Jews in Europe (Frankel and Zipperstein 2004), European immigrants in the United States (Glazer and Moynihan 1963) and generally foreigners in most immigration countries of South America or Australia. This sparked a parallel reaction on the emigration states side: the fear of

assimilation of its nationals abroad stimulated cultural policies to prevent it. In Germany, for example, the 1889 'All-German School Association' and post-WWI German Academic Exchange (DAAD, founded in 1925) were both conceived as ways to gather the 'nation' across borders and prevent it from dissolving abroad. Similarly, the Dante Alighieri institutes were famously implemented during the 1920s to spread 'national culture' and fascism amongst the Italian emigrant population (Totaro-Genevois 2005: 30). These anti-assimilationists 'aim[ed] to prevent expatriate or same-language communities from being integrated with foreign states, and to maintain them as potential foreign policy instruments, either in relation to territorial claims or to the procurement of economic and political advantage' (Paschalidis 2008: 4)

Yet, starting in the interwar period, assimilation policies became questioned, and with them the idea that those not belonging to the main ethnicity could be turned into loyal citizens. It is in this context that a second set of practices appeared: removing or transferring populations. One particular practice was seen in deportations on an ethno-national basis, from the forced removal of Slovenians and Croats from Italy in the 1930s and the 1940s up to the expulsions of Palestinians from Israel after 1948 (Walters 2002). On the emigration side, this translated in active policies of return: only within its territorial borders would the home state be able to guarantee the security of its citizens. Yet, the return was to be only for a certain ethnicity or religion. In Turkey for example, Armenians and Greek Orthodox minorities who had left the country during the way of independence were excluded from citizenship by the law of 1927. In

1933, the *Statute of Travelling* further regulated the return of Anatolian Christians (Kadirbeyoğlu 2010: 2). The complementarity of these two logics is best exemplified in the practice of mutual transfer of populations, in which two states conceive it as their best interest to both deport and import populations, for instance during the 1923 Greek-Turkish population exchange of about 1.5 million individuals (Hirschon 2003: 3) or the infamous India-Pakistan exchange of more than 12,5 million people (Khan 2007).<sup>16</sup> It is also in this logic that the final solution can be understood. As it is now documented, the idea of the extermination of Jews was seriously considered only after all options for a “territorial final solution” had been discarded.<sup>17</sup> Eichmann himself built his entire career a specialist of forced emigration (of Poles and Jews) before becoming an exterminator. At least in two documented occasions in 1936–37 and in 1942, he came into contact with Zionist organisations to facilitate the departures of Jewish German citizens to Palestine. During his trial in Israel in 1961, he went as far as claiming to have been “the new Herzl”(Cesarani 2004: 9). The collaboration between the Nazi regime and the Zionist organisations reveals the most tragic and most improbable coalition of interests created by the shared desire for homogeneous, territorial citizenries. One side saw it as a condition to preserve the purity of the race and assure it its *lebensraum*, the other as the condition of its physical and national survival.<sup>18</sup>

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Third, the pervasiveness of the territorial logic is found in practices when populations are not moved over borders, but borders over populations. At the peak of the expansion of nationalist ideas and practices, after the fall of the Ottoman and the Austrian empires, the model of the territorial federation emerges as one of the best blueprints to solve questions of ethnic heterogeneity in the Balkans or Central Europe (Bianchini 1996). Within these federations, the principle of territorial homogeneity remains the organising principle, as in Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union. The short-lived Soviet Jewish autonomous province of Birobidzhan best exemplifies this conception of the territory (REF). Another practice, the incorporation of missing parts of the national population left abroad in the citizenry by incorporating it territorially, is exemplified by the long history of more or less successful irredentist projects, from the Italian claims over Trieste, Trentino, Istria and Dalmatia to the 1936 Anschluss or the long list of Great Albania, Serbia, Croatia, Romania, Hungary Greece which marked the 20th century, as well as the lesser known contemporary claims of the Greater Nagaland and Chinland.

A final set of practices can be found in the practices of resistance of the excluded. In the immigration contexts of the 20th century, migrants and minorities mostly aimed at assimilating and fought for the recognition of their rights, with various degrees of success, in what Engin Isin defined as acts of citizenship (Isin 2002). Yet, when this goal seemed out of reach, the alternative was more often than not equally territorial: if citizenship was endangered in a territorial state, then another nation-state had to be created. This was the underlying logic of the Black emigrationist movement in the

early 20th century in Jim Crow Southern U.S., which anticipated Marcus Garvey's Back to Africa slogans (Sundiata 2003: 11-48). The paradigmatic model, and source of many other movements of the kind, remains Zionism. The state of Israel can be seen as the most accomplished result of this practice within which a secure citizenship is conceived as possible only through the territorialisation (and therefore refusal) of the diaspora. As an emigration state in which the emigration preceded the creation of the state, it has most zealously enforced the principles of territorial homogeneity as a precondition for security, at least until the 1990s. As Yfaat Weiss convincingly argues, the political context of the early years of Israel, when the Law of Return and the Law on Citizenship were designed, was marked more by the Zionists' memory of inter-war Eastern Europe than anything else. Among other factors, the ethnic understanding of citizenship, and more importantly "the adoption of a new spatial-land policy" focused on territorial security and agricultural development, provided the basis for the latest project of European territorial "nationalising state" (Weiss 2002). The territorialising project of the state of Israel can therefore be understood as one of the last contemporary attempts and (partial) successes at bringing a large population "back to the land", in great part in the name of security.

### ***Securing post-territorial "communities"***

The previous section has shown how the *sovereign* and *territorial* rationalities of power have structured the rationalisations through which threats to and from citizenship have been formulated. The widespread territorial rationality, more

specifically, brought together immigration and emigration states in securing their citizenries in mirror-like practices of homogenisation. Yet, two important changes have come about with the overall decline of the welfare state and the failure of socialist economies and the related progressive diffusion of what is commonly called a neoliberal or ‘advanced liberal’ form of governmentality, intended not only as an economic doctrine but as a form of government (Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1993; Rose 1999). First, the economic frame of reference for what it is to be governed is no longer thought of purely in terms of national territories; that is, competition is no longer predominantly inter-national, but local, regional and transnational. Hence, policies oriented towards providing welfare are progressively dismantled and become segmented in service to particular professional sectors, geographic locales or types of activity. Second, the ‘advanced liberal’ political economy brings about the idea that individuals are no longer to be passively and collectively governed through the impersonal figure of the state (through health care, social security, etc.) but that instead they should be active in their own government. Forms of allegiance and responsibilities are therefore oriented towards the local, and circles of solidarity are increasingly located in the community. By defining this process as the ‘the death of the social’, Nikolas Rose remarked that “such virtual communities are ‘diasporic’; they exist only to the extent that their constituents are linked together through identifications constructed in the non-geographic spaces of activist discourses, cultural products and media images” (Rose 1996: 333).

It is in this context that we are currently witnessing a progressive *bifurcation* between

immigration and emigration contexts. First, and despite the current political discourse on the supposed demise of multiculturalism (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010), *immigrants* are ever less required to assimilate in order to gain access to full or partial citizenship. Citizenship is ever less a marker of exclusive ethnic identity or national allegiance. Dual nationality is not only on the rise, but the undesirability of multiple citizenships has been removed from international agreements (Hailbronner 2003: 21). This, however, has not meant a desecuritisation of migrant citizens, but the opposite. Migrants, foreigners, minorities are increasingly policed and surveilled independently of their paper identity.

Second, and this has received less scholarly attention, the loosening of the territorial grip has meant, in emigration contexts, the appearance of what could be defined as forms of post-territorial citizenship: policies of diaspora inclusion or “global nations” premised on a de-territorialised, ethnic conception of citizenship, and a novel exclusion of unwanted territorialised ethnic groups.

*Immigration contexts: The decreasing relevance of citizenship*

Within the frame of mobility, the first evolution should be considered in the context of the contemporary imperative of circulation imposed by political economic ideas and practices of *laissez faire*, *laissez passer*. The era of disciplinary economic and political protectionism in which the territorialisation and homogenisation of citizenship took place is past (Sassen 2006). Immigration governments have by and large

acknowledged the necessary mobility of capital and labour, and have acknowledged the illusion constituted by closed territories and societies. Of course, the borders of immigration countries are still violent, as exemplified along the US–Mexican border (Doty 1999) or by the external border of the European Union (Jeandesboz 2008). Yet, despite the increasing number of deaths at the borders of the United States, Australia or Europe, and without diminishing the tragic individual fates behind statistical figures, these dead represent a numerically small number of individuals in relation to how many of the world’s migrants are indeed able to travel, circulate and develop transnational affiliations (Bigo 2010). As studies have documented, the concern of most immigration states and institutions has now moved from stopping and checking all, to assessing the risk of illegal migration, of terrorism, of human smuggling or organised crime (Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and Van Munster 2008; Aradau and Van Munster 2007).

In this process, citizenship is certainly an important feature, but it has increasingly become only one criterion among many to determine the potential threat posed by mobile citizens (Bigo et al. 2011). Biometric data held in travel documents, connected to a growing number of databases, are indeed increasingly complexifying the modalities of control and surveillance, through the progressive constitution of “smart borders” (Muller 2008; Salter 2004). The logic behind these forms of control has substantially altered the previous ways in which the relation between diasporas, security and citizenship has been articulated. More specifically, it has almost entirely abolished the suspicion of allegiance and loyalty towards a foreign state. Instead,

citizenship has become mostly an indicator of geographic provenience, to be correlated with other elements such as travel record, age and sex or dietary preferences (Amoore 2006). In a sense, the belief in biometrics and the anticipation of the future is giving less and less importance to alleged feelings of foreign loyalty and increasingly inscribes practices of security in the body of travellers and their data double, rather than a citizen.

Concerning the populations that are “already there”, post-nationalists are certainly right when they point out the fact that over the past forty years immigration states have substantially toned down projects of national homogenisation and assimilation of ethnolinguistic minorities and diasporic groups (despite the revival of assimilationist political discourses). Communities have been brought to the fore as a new concept of government that is more in line with modalities of government that have abandoned *the social* as an object of government (Donzelot 1994). The neoliberal reaction to the contradictions of the welfare state has been to shift the management responsibility from the social to *communities* as “a new plane or surface upon which micro-moral relations among persons are conceptualised and administered” (Rose 1996: 331). As such, multiculturalism has replaced the previous models of incorporation, precisely constituting communities as a new object of government for politicians, psychiatrists, health care professionals and security forces. The move to communities therefore does not provide us with more evidence of a desecuritisation of movement and mobility; instead, it provides us with a re-articulation of the object of policing and surveillance. Rose reminds us that community, as a concept, emerges in part from sociological and

bureaucratic sources, but that it is rapidly picked up by the police to talk about things such as the West Indian community. Rapidly, communities became new objects to be “investigated, mapped, classified, documented, interpreted” (Rose 1996: 331). Similarly, communities have progressively been asked to police themselves, as in programs of community policing which have flourished in North America, Europe and Australia. While the social was essentially territorial and constituted by individuals captured by the political form of citizenship, communities define a new object of government in which the distinction between citizens and non-citizens is made irrelevant. What is at stake, instead, is the quality of opportunity and risk constituted by the communities, both for the individuals who compose them and for the states that govern them. So while the question of loyalty of certain citizens might still be posed, it is currently posed mostly in relation to their perceived or alleged belonging to a risk community. The category of Muslim has for example emerged in the U.K and many European countries as a “suspect community”, irrespective of its members actual religious practice or political views of its members (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009).

*The emigration context: Post-territorial citizenship*

On the emigration side, the passage from welfarism or developmental policies to neoliberal conceptions of government has similarly brought about significant change. In this case, however, it has reinforced the importance of citizenship. Sending states have increasingly used citizenship or para-citizenship<sup>19</sup> to solve the tension between

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<sup>19</sup> By para-citizenship, I refer to all sorts of symbolic documents and cards delivered to emigrants with the

economic growth strategies demanding a circulation of its population and the fear of a brain-drain and dispersion of resources. Citizenship here serves as the main tool through which a population residing abroad is perceived and included as useful for the economic or political interests of the state. The specificity of this new form of citizenship is that it no longer is tied to residential or territorial constraints; rather than a *post-national* modality of citizenship, it can be defined as *post-territorial*.

These symbolic politics have first started with a major relabeling of groups abroad, from “immigrants”, “refugees”, “political exiles”, or “guest workers”, they are now officially “diasporas”, “global nations” or “nations abroad” (Brubaker 2005; Schnapper 2001; Smith 2003). Previously pejorative terms become the object of stigma reversals, for example the valorisation of the “pochos” (i.e. ???) by the Programme for Mexican Communities Abroad (Smith 2003: 728). Heads of states increasingly embrace populations that were previously forgotten. While Zionism was based on a negation of the diasporic existence, Ariel Sharon announced in 2002 that he understood his mandate as unifying not only Israel but “Jews worldwide” (Shain and Bristman 2002: 77); Mexico’s president Vicente Fox announced in 2000 that he would “govern on behalf of 118 million Mexicans,” 18 million of whom are living in the United States (Varadarajan 2010: 3). Similarly, diasporas are increasingly becoming a specific “state category”. This has translated into administrative modifications of sending states and a multiplication of “diaspora” ministries and agencies; be it the

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purpose of giving them a special status. These are, for example, the Person of Indian Origin (PIO) card, the “Pink Card” in Turkey or the “CRO Card” in Croatia.

Ministry of Diaspora in Serbia or in Armenia, the Institute for Mexicans Abroad in Mexico, the Irish Abroad Unit in Ireland, the Ministry of Italians Abroad in Italy, the Commission on Filipinos Overseas, the Overseas Employment Office in China and a broad range of ‘diaspora’ ministries across the Middle East and Africa. In this context, sending states’ citizenship laws have increasingly been amended in favour of dual citizenship: a specific legal status and identification documents are often given to expatriates, for instance Non-resident Indians (NRI) and Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) in India, for example or ‘Matricula Consular’ in Mexico. Similar types of status exist thus far in Argentina, Colombia, Salvador, Honduras, Peru, Morocco, Pakistan and Turkey.

The institutionalization of diasporic citizenship has however not meant an opening up or a move towards a more cosmopolitan conception of belonging, as post-nationalists would argue. In most emigration countries, the extension citizenship to co-ethnics outside the territorial borders of the state goes with exclusionary practices towards the non-ethnics on the territory. The ethnicization or re-ethnicization of citizenship can be seen in the re-emergence of essentialized conceptions of belonging such as “italianità” (Italianness), “mexicanidad” (Mexicanness), “Hrvatsvo” (Croatianess), “Hindutva” (Indianness). These conceptions allow to repackage heterogeneous national constructions as a homogeneous essence, and more importantly as a feature that is independent from the territory. Italianità, for example, can be used to refer to a hypothetical national character shared by all Italians, no matter where they live. It therefore become a mobile criterion of belonging through which institutionalized state

practices can be deployed. Similarly, the Croatian Law on Citizenship of 1991 has explicitly aimed at both including Croats everywhere in the world, and exclude as many non-Croats (i.e. Serbs)(Ragazzi and Štikš 2009). Comparable developments have taken place in Serbia and Macedonia in which the aim has been explicitly to exclude Albanians from the national population (Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011). The debate around the Status Law in Hungary, which extends citizenship to Hungarians abroad, revolves around similar patterns of inclusion and exclusion (Waterbury 2006). Examples can be found in several other emigration countries outside Europe. Israel recent reconsideration of its relation with its diaspora is similarly grounded in the ideal of a non-Palestinian and non-Arab citizenry (Levy and Weiss 2002). India's diaspora policy promoted by the BJP has run parallel to a discourse of exclusion of the Muslims from Indian citizenship (Jaffrelot and Therwath 2007). In sum, the inclusion of co-ethnics abroad has meant, in several contexts, the simultaneous exclusion of non co-ethnics on the territory. Rather than a form of inclusion, diaspora policies have therefore meant a redefinition of the borders of the nation and a renewed modality of discrimination.

### ***Conclusion***

In our most recent history, diasporic and transnational forms of identification, mobilisation and belonging have been constituted as a question of security in a context in which the homogenisation of citizenship was the governmental project. As this

chapter has argued, this project has been linked mainly to specific rationalisations as to how wealth is concentrated and organised, and how loyalty and security can be best assured and organised. In this sense, a history of citizenship cannot be separated from the history of the different rationalities of power within which it has been deployed (Isin 2002). The contemporary era is marked by the progressive unbundling of territory, identities and political orders. Yet the consequences of this process for citizenship should not be interpreted as the emergence of cosmopolitan norms of citizenship, but rather as a redistribution of the features of citizenship. On the one hand, it continues to be a tool for governments to distribute and organize practices of control, surveillance and exclusion. On the other hand, citizenship always potentially enables acts of citizenship that bear the promise of further inclusion. I have shown how the neoliberal production of community “as a logic of governing that migrates and is selectively taken up in diverse political contexts” (Ong 2007: 3) appears to be translated in the terms of communitarian citizenship in immigration contexts and in the forms of post-territorial citizenship in emigration contexts. These are two sides of the same coin, and mark a deep shift in the rationalities of citizenship, increasingly oriented towards privileging the criteria of race, religion or ethnicity to the detriment of those of territoriality and residence (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999). These practices do not go unchallenged, and the contemporary evolution of citizenship does not go without generating its new modalities of resistance.

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