

# **Diasporas, Security, Citizenship**

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# 9

## DIASPORAS, SECURITY, CITIZENSHIP

*Francesco Ragazzi*

In March 2012, a serious conflict arose between the Dutch government and its higher advisory body, the Council of State. The government proposed to change the law on citizenship, claiming that immigrants should lose their citizenship of origin if they wanted to acquire Dutch citizenship. Dutch Minister of Home Affairs, Liesbeth Spies, argued that limiting people to one nationality would clarify 'the rights and obligations between the state and the individual' (Dutch News.nl 2012b). More openly, a conservative minister had argued a few years earlier that dual citizenship represented the threat of 'loyalty to two countries' (Dutch News.nl 2010). In reply, the Council of State argued that people with more than one nationality are not necessarily less integrated. On the contrary, dual nationality had thus far been considered a way to integrate foreigners: 'nationality and loyalty are not automatically the same thing' (Dutch News.nl 2012a).

The position of the ~~current~~ Dutch government, formed by conservative parties and backed by Geert Wilders' populist Party of Freedom (PVV), is a rather marginal one in both Europe and the rest of the world. Contrary to the international agreements of the 1930s, reaffirmed until the European Convention on Nationality of 1997, dual citizenship has indeed been an increasingly accepted fact of life in international relations. Fewer than 5 per cent of countries allowed dual citizenship in 1959; this figure is now about 50 per cent (Sejersen 2008: 531). This phenomenon is just one indicator of the progressive acceptance of transnational or diasporic forms of belonging. ~~This chapter asks,~~ what are the implications of this phenomenon for this volume's reflexion on citizenship and security?

### **Post-national or post-territorial?**

The contemporary evolution of citizenship, in the light of the rise of transnationalism, has generally been understood as an advancement of post-national or

cosmopolitan ideals and values. Many hold the view that transnational citizenship has been de-securitized,<sup>1</sup> removed from the realm of what constitutes the crucial and vital interests of individuals, societies or states (Kymlicka 2002). Several scholars, designated as post-nationalists and cosmopolitans, have formulated a similar argument in relation to globalization.<sup>2</sup> Most famously, Yasemin Soysal has advanced the idea that the nation-state might be losing ground in terms of the primacy – or the imposition – of a national identity on its residents, and in particular the established migrants. Soysal (1994) argues that people increasingly relate to identities that are subnational (a Berliner, for example), supranational (European) or transnational (Euro-Turkish, Euro-Moroccan). Rights, she argues, are no longer guaranteed exclusively by the host state, but by human rights norms enshrined in treaties that came into force after the Second World War. As a consequence, citizenship is increasingly disconnected from a specific identity and from the attribution of rights; hence, the emergence of a post-national form of citizenship (see also Benhabib 2007: 19–21). Migrants and diasporas are, therefore, the key historical subject through which post-national and cosmopolitan forms of citizenship can emerge.

This stance has been criticized from several points of view. Scholars such as Hansen, who defend the primacy of the nation-state, argue that it is not losing importance as a generator of rights, that national citizenship has never been the only basis of identity, and that citizenship is the only institution which provides for the civic and political rights which permanent residents do not enjoy (Hansen 2009: 5). Many others have pointed out that the enthusiasm for more inclusive, multicultural forms of citizenship during the 1990s has been rendered obsolete by the spectre of terrorism after 9/11. The strong rise of populism and Islamophobia in Europe, and the harsh crackdown on undocumented migrants at the borders of Europe, seem to confirm this sceptical view (Cesari 2004). Does this, however, mean that nothing has changed in the past 40 years?

The main problem with the debate around post-national and cosmopolitan citizenship is that it is permeated by an implicit set of ~~normative~~ assumptions. The first ~~problematic assumption lies in~~ the conflation of the ‘national’ with the ‘territorial’. All that is ‘national’ – and therefore nationalism – can, according to this view, only be territorial. Anything that goes beyond the territory must, therefore, be post-national. Thus, transnational practices are interpreted as necessarily undermining the logic of nationalism and its exclusionary effects – and therefore as a sign of resistance or cosmopolitanism. ~~The second problematic assumption is that~~ state power is considered as exclusively territorial. Processes that stretch beyond the territoriality of the state are assumed to escape its power – and are, therefore, solely ruled by individual (ethical) or global (human rights) norms. The conflation of the nation and territory on the one hand, and state and territory on the other, paradoxically produces the false idea that any forms of belonging that cross boundaries are necessarily progressive and cosmopolitan.

My main disagreement with authors on both sides of the debate is, therefore, that modifications to the ways the state operates have been obscured; the debate relies

on an out-dated understanding of the state as territorially bound. State elites and sectors of government are not, and have never been, purely national. Transnational networks of professionals can have more importance than national hierarchies, as Didier Bigo has shown for the case of European policing (Bigo 1996), and Dezalay and Garth have shown for international lawyers and economists (Dezalay and Garth 2002). Governments frequently engage in practices of power beyond the borders that traditionally legitimate them to do so; visa and immigration policies, for example, are often implemented in the countries of departure, even before migrants are able to start their trip (Bigo and Guild 2005; Salter 2007). In sum, and as many authors have argued, in the context of globalized flows, states become transnational too.

Building on this critique, the chapter develops two arguments. In the first section, I show that the development of modern citizenship within the model of the nation-state has been marked by a strong *securitization* of transnational communities and diasporas, through the pursuit of territorially homogeneous citizenship. This period was characterized by a convergence of the objectives – the reduction of dual citizenship, overlapping identities and multiple loyalties – of both immigration and emigration states. In the second section, I claim that the current questioning of territoriality has not resulted in the *desecuritization* of migrant citizens. Instead, it has brought about a *bifurcation* of the logics of managing migration between *immigration* and *emigration* contexts, both underpinned by ethno-religious conceptions of political community. On the one hand, in immigration contexts, immigrants are decreasingly required to assimilate in order to gain access to citizenship. Compared to the previous era, citizenship has become a concern of secondary order. But they are no less surveilled. Biometrics, profiling and preventive policing moves the state's attention to ethnicity, religion and culture – broadly speaking to 'communities' – irrespective of a citizen's official documents. On the other hand, in emigration contexts, we witness the emergence of what could be defined as forms of post-territorial citizenship: policies of diaspora inclusion or 'global nations' premised on a de-territorialized, ethnic conception of citizenship, and the novel exclusion of unwanted territorialized ethnic groups.

### From perpetual allegiance to territorial citizenship

Until the emergence of the first democratic states, citizenship was mostly considered as a question of state security. Grounded in natural law and encoded in English common law, the principle of perpetual allegiance underpinned a citizenship regime in which subjects had no control over their citizenship, needing to obtain the consent of the sovereign to renounce it (Legomsky 2003: 109). The sovereign–subject relationship was therefore understood as 'one of parent and child: a product of nature, hence indissoluble' (Spiro 1997: 1417). It is around this principle that most international citizenship battles were played out, until the end of the first half of the twentieth century.

With the American (1776) and the French (1789) revolutions, perpetual allegiance started to be challenged as a principle regulating citizenship. Throughout

most of the nineteenth century, the freedom to decide one's citizenship waxed and waned according to political circumstances and, more often than not, to military preoccupations. France for example, with the 1803 civil code, was one of the first states to give citizens the freedom to move abroad and acquire a foreign citizenship.<sup>3</sup> On the eve of the war with Austria, however, Napoleon overturned this provision and required even those who had already naturalized (acquired a new citizenship) in another state to come back. On 26 August 1811, it became illegal to acquire foreign nationality without the permission of the Emperor (Weil *et al.* 2010: 7).

In many states adhering to notions of perpetual allegiance, naturalization – the acquisition of the citizenship of another state – was perceived as a direct offence to the sovereign. A telling example of the tension between perpetual allegiance and the new individual freedoms was, in the Anglo-Saxon context, the British policy of forced enrolment (*impresement*) of US-naturalized subjects of British origins into its Navy, one of the factors that led to the war of 1812. The prince regent captured the view of the time on stating that '[The allegiance of subjects] is no optional duty, which they can decline and resume at pleasure. It is a call which they are bound to obey; it began with their birth and can only terminate with their existence' (Feldman and Baldwin 2007: 144). Similar measures existed in Turkey and China where, as of 1815, expatriation was punished with death and the banishment of the entire family (Spiro 1997: 1420). Throughout the nineteenth century, new immigration states, such as the United States, Argentina, Australia and Brazil,<sup>4</sup> pushed for the release from previous citizenship of their new citizens; in response, most (emigration) European states either denied, or severely restricted, the right of expatriation, at the same time facilitating re-naturalization.

In response to the increased outflow of their population, and the naturalization of their citizens in immigration countries, emigration states exploited the ambiguities of citizenship laws and relaxed, in practice, the requirement of exclusive citizenship. Pre-First World War Italy, for example, allowed article 4 of the 1865 code (*ius sanguinis* for children born abroad) to take precedence over article 11, which did not allow dual citizenship, creating, *de facto*, a significant number of dual nationals (Tintori 2010: 96–7). Similarly, the 1913 German citizenship law replaced previous provisions regarding citizenship loss based on residence, and allowed for the preservation or reacquisition of German citizenship regardless of naturalization (Brubaker 1992: 115). A similar trend was found in several other states across Europe and the world, the result being an exponential increase in dual citizenship. Dual nationals not only created an anomaly that did not fit the strict principles of territorial sovereignty; the increase in their numbers raised diplomatic tensions. Of particular concern was the military conscription of naturalized immigrants on returning to their homelands, which happened frequently (Legomsky 2003: 89).<sup>5</sup>

Throughout the nineteenth century, the citizenship laws of emigration countries thereby constituted an indirect diplomatic negotiation with immigration countries over the 'property' of population; what Koslowski defines as a 'tug of war' between receiving and sending states (Koslowski 2001: 215). This tug of war

was principally fought over a population conceived as indicating the strength of the sovereign power; it had nothing to do with the point of view of the population itself. As Spiro puts it:

In this frame, actual sentiments of allegiance on the part of subjects were of an import equivalent to sentiments of allegiance on the part of, say, cannonballs. Expatriation represented an intolerable loss of strength to the birth sovereign, in something of a human equivalent of mercantilist paradigms.

*(Spiro 1997: 1422)*

Over the years, however, the conflict was settled in favour of the new immigration states; this, in turn, generalized the freedom to choose one's citizenship. In the US, the catalyst for international negotiation was the arrest of naturalized US citizens as British subjects in relation to an uprising in Ireland in 1868. These individuals were subsequently denied a trial procedure reserved for aliens. Public outrage ensued, causing the US Congress to pass a law reaffirming expatriation as a fundamental right (Spiro 1997: 1428). In a series of bilateral treaties, known as the Bancroft Treaties, agreed between the US and European countries, emigration states eventually recognized their citizens' right to expatriation. The problem of migrant populations' allegiance – whether to emigration or immigration states – was therefore progressively solved through bilateral agreements. Dual nationality had clearly been designated as a problem to be solved, and was dealt with by an agreement to implement policies of freedom of expatriation on the emigration side, and naturalization on the immigration side.

Yet the First World War showed the limits of the system. Despite the agreements, many states claimed their nationals abroad. Within the framework of the League of Nations-sponsored International Codification Conference, the regulation of nationality – the success of which was conceived as a solution to future conflicts – became central (Koslowski 2001: 207). The 1930 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws established that 'it is in the interest of the international community to secure that all members should recognize that every person should have a nationality and should have one nationality only' (League of Nations 1930: preamble, quoted in Koslowski 2001: 206). Meanwhile, A Protocol Relating to Military Obligations in Certain Cases of Double Nationality regulated military matters, with the principal measures ascertaining the automatic expatriation of naturalized citizens, and reinforcing the principle of freedom of renunciation of one's nationality (Legomsky 2003: 92). The Bancroft Treaties, along with the Hague convention, therefore marked a certain generalization of the principle of free choice of one's citizenship, but also established the juridical framework and the symbolic encoding in international law of the principle of exclusivity of territorial citizenship, which remained mostly untouched until the last three decades.

Up until the end of the nineteenth century the main point of contention concerning citizenship was, therefore, the freedom to choose it. This freedom was

intended to suppress medieval affiliations with the former country and allow the principle of territorialized and mutually exclusive citizenship to function. Yet, through the principle of strict mutually exclusive citizenship, it was state security that was sought after and guaranteed.

### **Territorialized citizens must be defended**

The nineteenth century marks the progressive dominance of territorially based national homogenization – the idea that each country should be composed of one single nation, living in a clearly demarcated territory. The ways in which nationalism operated, through citizenship, to territorially homogenize populations in immigration countries have been the subject of much scholarly attention,<sup>6</sup> and it is not the purpose of this chapter to revisit them. Rather, I would like to highlight the processes through which immigration and emigration countries have converged in outlining common *problems* and finding mirror-like *solutions* to ensure the national and territorial homogeneity of their states' citizenry.

Let us first look at the ways in which migration has been conceptualized as posing a security problem to 'the nation' of citizens. From the end of the nineteenth century, national diversity was progressively problematized as posing a threat to two aspects of political life. First, heterogeneity within the national territory came to be considered, albeit not without complex political struggles, as a problem of allegiance and loyalty. For immigration countries, there arose a fear of the 'fifth column' – a fear that certain ethnic groups, by preserving their ethno-national identities, posed a threat to national security (Cohen 1996). This fear was mirrored on the emigration side. Thus, the loyalty of those leaving or staying abroad was considered equally suspect (Shain 1990). A second problématique, characteristic of the beginning of the twentieth century, was a fear of the corruption of the culture, the nation, or the race. Through biological metaphors, only the adequacy between nation and territory came to be considered as a 'healthy' form of political existence. As a result of the perceived security threat, therefore, both immigration and emigration states devised solutions which prioritized territorial, nationally homogeneous citizenries.

A first set of practices aimed at creating national homogeneity was based on the premise that migrants could become *nationalized* citizens. Thus, for immigration states, ethno-cultural diversity could be resolved through naturalization and assimilation. The acquisition of citizenship therefore became progressively associated with the acquisition of national features, be it for Jews in Europe (Frankel and Zipperstein 2004), European immigrants in the United States (Glazer and Moynihan 1963) or foreigners in most immigration countries of South America or Australia. In turn, emigration states used cultural policies to try to prevent the assimilation of their nationals abroad. In Germany, for example, both the 1889 'All-German School Association', and the post-First World War German Academic Exchange (DAAD, founded in 1925), were conceived as ways to gather the 'nation' across borders and prevent it from dissolving abroad. Similarly, the Dante Alighieri

institutes were set up during the 1920s to spread ‘national culture’ and fascism amongst the Italian emigrant population (Totaro–Genevois 2005: 30). These anti-assimilationists ‘aim[ed] to prevent expatriate or same-language communities from being integrated with foreign states, and to maintain them as potential foreign policy instruments, either in relation to territorial claims or to the procurement of economic and political advantage’ (Paschalidis 2008: 4).

Yet, beginning in the inter-war period, assimilation policies were questioned, and with them the idea that those not belonging to the main ethnicity could be turned into loyal citizens. It is in this context that a second set of practices appeared: removing or transferring populations. One particular practice was deportation on an ethno-national basis, from the forced removal of Slovenians and Croats from Italy in the 1930s and the 1940s, to the expulsion of Palestinians from Israel after 1948 (Walters 2002). On the emigration side, this translated into active policies of return: only within its territorial borders would the home state be able to guarantee the security of its citizens. Yet, these policies were confined to certain ethnicities or religions. In Turkey, for example, Armenians and Greek Orthodox minorities who had left the country during the War of Independence were excluded from citizenship by a law passed in 1927. In 1933, the *Statute of Travelling* further regulated the return of Anatolian Christians (Kadirbeyođ 2010: 2). The complementarity of these two logics is best exemplified in the practice of mutual transfer of populations, in which two states conceive it as in their best interest to both deport and import populations. One example was the 1923 Greek–Turkish population exchange of about 1.5 million individuals (Hirschon 2003: 3); another, the infamous India–Pakistan exchange of more than 12.5 million people (Khan 2007). It is also as part of this logic that Nazi Germany’s Final Solution can be understood. As is now documented, the idea of the extermination of Jews was only seriously considered after all options for a ‘territorial final solution’ had been rejected.<sup>7</sup> Eichmann himself built his entire career as a specialist of forced emigration (of Poles and Jews), before becoming an exterminator. On at least two documented occasions, in 1936–37 and in 1942, he came into contact with Zionist organizations to facilitate the departures of Jewish–German citizens to Palestine. During his trial in Israel in 1961, he went as far as claiming to have been ‘the new Herzl’ (Cesarani 2004: 9). The collaboration between the Nazi regime and Zionist organizations reveals a most tragic and improbable coalition of interests, created by the shared desire for homogeneous, territorial citizenries. One side saw it as a precondition for preserving the purity of the race and ensuring its *lebensraum*, the other as a precondition of its physical and national survival.

The pervasiveness of the territorial logic is found in a third practice, where populations are not moved over borders, but borders over populations. At the peak of the expansion of nationalist ideas and practices, after the fall of the Ottoman and the Austrian empires, the model of the territorial federation emerges as one of the most effective blueprints for solving questions of ethnic heterogeneity in the Balkans and Central Europe (Bianchini 1996). Within these federations, the principle of territorial homogeneity remains the organizing principle, as in Yugoslavia or the Soviet

Union. The short-lived, autonomous province of Birobidzhan, which was created to 'settle' the Jewish population of the USSR, best exemplifies the impossibility of thinking about a national existence other than within territorial confines (Murphy 1989). Another practice, the territorial incorporation of parts of the national population left abroad is exemplified by the long history of more or less successful irredentist projects, from the Italian claims over Trieste, Trentino, Istria and Dalmatia, to the 1936 Anschluss, or the long list of Great Albania, Serbia, Croatia, Romania, Hungary and Greece which featured during the twentieth century, as well as the lesser known contemporary claims of Greater Nagaland and Chinland.

A final set of practices can be found in the resistance of the excluded. In the immigration contexts of the twentieth century, migrants and minorities mostly aimed at assimilation, and they fought for the recognition of their rights – with various degrees of success – in what Engin Isin has defined as 'acts of citizenship' (Isin 2002). Yet, when this goal seemed out of reach, the alternative was more often than not equally territorial: the creation of another nation-state. This was the underlying logic of the Black emigrationist movement in the early twentieth century, in Jim Crow Southern USA, which anticipated Marcus Garvey's Back to Africa slogans (Sundiata 2003: 11–48). The paradigmatic model, and inspiration, for many other similar movements, remains Zionism. The state of Israel can be seen as the most accomplished result of the practice whereby a secure citizenship is conceived as possible only through the territorialization (and therefore negation) of the diaspora. As an emigration state in which the emigration preceded the creation of the state, it has most zealously enforced the principle of territorial homogeneity as a precondition for security, at least until the 1990s. As Yfaat Weiss convincingly argues, the political context of the early years of Israel, when the Law of Return and the Law on Citizenship were designed, was particularly marked by the Zionists' memory of inter-war Eastern Europe. Among other factors, the ethnic understanding of citizenship, and more importantly 'the adoption of a new spatial-land policy' focused on territorial security and agricultural development, provided the basis for the latest project of European territorial 'nationalizing state' (Weiss 2002: 87). The territorializing project of the state of Israel can therefore be understood as one of the last contemporary attempts and (partial) successes at bringing a large population 'back to the land', for the most part in the name of security.

### Securing post-territorial 'communities'

The importance of territoriality brought together immigration and emigration states in securing their citizenries in mirror-like practices of territorial homogenization. Over the past 30 to 40 years, however, this has no longer been the case. Several factors have influenced this change. First, as scholars have pointed out, the welfare state's need for territorial borders – and a fortiori the socialist economies' need for them – has always been in stark contradiction to transnational flows of goods and people. The new doctrine of free trade has removed many of these barriers, encouraging instead the free movement of financial flows, and economic development based on

the circulation of capital and labour. Similarly, neoliberal principles of management have severely reduced the scale of the welfare state. Forms of allegiance and responsibilities are therefore oriented towards the local, and circles of solidarity are increasingly located in the community, a process Nikolas Rose has defined as 'the death of the social' (Rose 1996: 333). It is in this context that we are currently witnessing a progressive *bifurcation* between immigration and emigration contexts.

### ***Immigration contexts: the decreasing relevance of citizenship***

Immigrants are decreasingly required to assimilate in order to gain access to full or partial citizenship. Citizenship is ever less a marker of exclusive ethnic identity or national allegiance. The era of disciplinary economic and political protectionism in which the territorialization and homogenization of citizenship took place is in the past (Sassen 2006). Dual nationality is not only on the rise, but the undesirability of multiple citizenships has been removed from most international agreements (Hailbronner 2003: 21).

Immigration governments have, by and large, accepted the necessary mobility of capital and labour, and acknowledged the illusion constituted by closed territories and societies. Of course, the borders of immigration countries are still violent, as exemplified by the US–Mexican border (Doty 1999) or by the external border of the European Union (Jeandesboz 2008). But the deaths at these borders represent a numerically small number of individuals relative to the number of migrants who are indeed able to travel, circulate and develop transnational affiliations (Bigo 2009). The concern of most immigration states and institutions has now moved away from stopping and checking all entrants, to filtering flows, and assessing the risk of illegal migration, terrorism, human smuggling or organized crime (Aradau *et al.* 2008; Aradau and Van Munster 2007).

In this process, citizenship is certainly an important feature, but it has become only one criterion among many in determining the potential threat posed by mobile citizens (Bigo *et al.* 2011). Biometric data, held in travel documents and connected to a growing number of databases, are indeed increasingly complexifying the modalities of control and surveillance, through the progressive constitution of 'smart borders' (Muller 2008; Salter 2004). The logic behind these forms of control has substantially altered the ways in which the relation between diasporas, security and citizenship have hitherto been articulated. More specifically, it has almost entirely abolished the suspicion of allegiance and loyalty towards a foreign state. Instead, citizenship has become mostly an indicator of geographic provenience, to be correlated with other elements such as travel record, age and sex or dietary preferences (Amoore 2006). In a sense, the belief in biometrics is giving less and less importance to alleged feelings of loyalty to a foreign state, and increasingly inscribes practices of security in the body of travellers and their data double, rather than in the paper documents they hold.

Concerning the populations that are 'already there', post-nationalists are certainly right when they point out that over the past 40 years immigration states

have substantially toned down projects of national homogenization and assimilation of ethnolinguistic minorities and diasporic groups (despite the revival of assimilationist political discourses). The neoliberal reaction to the contradictions of the welfare state has been to shift the management responsibility from the social to *communities* as ‘a new plane or surface upon which micro-moral relations among persons are conceptualized and administered’ (Rose 1996: 331). As such, multiculturalism has replaced the previous models of incorporation, precisely constituting communities as a new object of government for politicians, psychiatrists, health care professionals and security forces. The move to communities does not therefore provide us with more evidence of a desecuritization of movement and mobility; instead, it provides us with a re-articulation of the object of policing and surveillance. Rose reminds us that community, as a concept, emerges in part from sociological and bureaucratic sources, but that it is rapidly picked up by the police to talk about, for example, the West Indian community. Rapidly, communities became new objects to be ‘investigated, mapped, classified, documented, interpreted’ (Rose 1996: 331). Similarly, communities have progressively been asked to police themselves, as in programmes of community policing which have flourished in North America, Europe and Australia. While the social was essentially territorial and constituted by individuals captured by a political form of citizenship, communities define a new object of government in which the distinction between citizens and non-citizens becomes less and less important. What is at stake, instead, is the quality of opportunity and risk constituted by the communities, both for the individuals who compose them and for the states that govern them. So, while the question of the loyalty of certain citizens might still be posed, it is currently posed mostly in relation to their perceived or alleged belonging to a risk community. The category of Muslim has, for example, emerged in the UK and many European countries as a ‘suspect community’, irrespective of its members’ citizenship, actual religious practice or political views (Pantazis and Pemberton 2009).

### ***The emigration context: post-territorial citizenship***

What has received less scholarly attention is how the loosening of the territorial grip has meant, in emigration contexts, the appearance of what I have termed forms of ‘post-territorial citizenship’, namely policies of ‘diaspora inclusion’ or ‘global nations’ premised on a de-territorialized, ethnic conception of citizenship, and a novel exclusion of unwanted territorialized ethnic groups (Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011). Here again, post-territorial politics do not coincide with cosmopolitan or de-securitized politics.

The passage from welfarism and developmental policies to neoliberal conceptions of government has in this case reinforced the importance of citizenship. Sending states have increasingly used citizenship or para-citizenship<sup>8</sup> to address the tension between economic growth strategies demanding the circulation of its population, and the fear of a brain-drain and dispersion of resources. Here, citizenship serves as the main tool through which a population residing abroad is perceived as useful for the economic or political interests of the state.

This symbolic politics began with a major relabelling of groups abroad. From 'immigrants', 'refugees', 'political exiles', or 'guest workers', they are now officially labelled as 'diasporas', 'global nations' or 'nations abroad' (Brubaker 2005). Previously pejorative terms became the object of stigma reversals, for example the valorization of the 'pochos' (the derogatory term for Mexicans abroad) by the Programme for Mexican Communities Abroad (Smith 2003: 728). Heads of state increasingly embrace populations that were previously forgotten. While Zionism was based on a negation of the diasporic existence, Ariel Sharon announced in 2002 that he understood his mandate as unifying not only Israel but 'Jews worldwide' (Shain and Bristman 2002: 77); Mexico's president, Vicente Fox, announced in 2000 that he would 'govern on behalf of 118 million Mexicans', 18 million of whom are living in the United States (Varadarajan 2010: 3). Similarly, diasporas are increasingly becoming a specific state category. This has translated into administrative modifications on the part of sending states and a multiplication of diaspora ministries and agencies; be it the Ministry of Diaspora in Serbia or in Armenia, the Institute for Mexicans Abroad in Mexico, the Irish Abroad Unit in Ireland, the Ministry of Italians Abroad in Italy, the Commission on Filipinos Overseas, the Overseas Employment Office in China, or a broad range of 'diaspora' ministries across the Middle East and Africa. In this context, sending states' citizenship laws have increasingly been amended in favour of dual citizenship: a specific legal status and identification documents are often given to expatriates, for instance Non-resident Indians (NRI) and Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) in India, or 'Matricula Consular' in Mexico. To date, similar statuses also exist in Argentina, Colombia, Salvador, Honduras, Peru, Morocco, Pakistan and Turkey.

The institutionalization of diasporic citizenship has, however, not meant an opening up, or a move towards a more cosmopolitan conception of belonging, as post-nationalists would argue. In most emigration countries, the extension of citizenship to co-ethnics outside the territorial borders of the state sits alongside exclusionary practices towards non-ethnics in the territory. The ethnicization or re-ethnicization of citizenship can be seen in the re-emergence of essentialized conceptions of belonging such as 'italianità' (Italianness), 'mexicanidad' (Mexican-ness), 'Hrvatsvo' (Croatian-ness), and 'Hindutva' (Indian-ness). These conceptions allow the repackaging of heterogeneous national constructions as a homogeneous essence and, more importantly, as a feature that is independent from territory. Italianità, Hindutva or Hrvatsvo refer to a hypothetical national character shared by all members of an ethnic or religious group, no matter where they live. It therefore becomes a mobile criterion of belonging through which institutionalized state practices can be deployed. For example, the Croatian Law on Citizenship of 1991 has explicitly aimed at both including Croats everywhere in the world, and excluding as many non-Croats (that is, Serbs). Comparable developments have taken place in Serbia and Macedonia in which the explicit aim has been to exclude (for the most part) Albanians from the national population (Ragazzi and Balalovska 2011). The debate around the Status Law in Hungary, which extends citizenship to Hungarians abroad, revolves around similar patterns of inclusion and exclusion

(Waterbury 2006). Examples can be found in several other emigration countries outside Europe. Israel's recent reconsideration of its relationship with its diaspora is similarly grounded in the ideal of a non-Palestinian and non-Arab citizenry (Levy and Weiss 2002). India's diaspora policy, promoted by the BJP, has run parallel to a discourse of exclusion of Muslims from Indian citizenship (Jaffrelot and Therwath 2007). In sum, the inclusion of co-ethnics abroad has meant, in several contexts, the simultaneous exclusion of non co-ethnics in the territory. Rather than a form of inclusion, diaspora policies have therefore meant a redefinition of the borders of the nation and a renewed modality of discrimination.

## Conclusion

In recent history, diasporic and transnational forms of identification, mobilization and belonging have been constituted as a question of security in a context in which the territorial homogenization of citizenship was the governmental project. As this chapter has argued, these practices were linked to specific rationalizations concerning the concentration and redistribution of wealth, as well as the provision of security, in return for loyalty. In this sense, a history of citizenship cannot be separated from the history of the different rationalities of power within which it has been deployed (Isin 2002). The contemporary era is marked by the progressive unbundling of territory, identities and political orders. Yet the consequences of this process for citizenship should not be interpreted as the emergence of cosmopolitan norms and the desecuritization of citizenship, but rather as a redistribution of the features of citizenship. On the one hand, it continues to be a tool for governments to distribute and organize practices of control, surveillance and exclusion. On the other hand, citizenship always potentially enables acts of citizenship which bear the promise of further inclusion. Aihwa Ong has argued that neoliberalism is 'a logic of governing that migrates and is selectively taken up in diverse political contexts' (Ong 2007: 3). I have suggested that this logic does not produce the same effects in countries of immigration and countries of emigration. In the former, neoliberal changes have translated into the production of, and government through, community, relegating formal citizenship to one governing device among others. In countries of emigration, however, it has underpinned forms of post-territorial citizenship which include diasporas and transnational communities abroad, to the detriment of unwanted migrants and minorities present in the territory. These are, however, two sides of the same coin, and mark a deep shift in the rationalities of citizenship, which are increasingly oriented towards the criteria of race, religion or ethnicity (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999). However, these practices do not go unchallenged, and the contemporary evolution of citizenship is generating new modalities of resistance.

## Notes

- 1 This chapter assumes that readers are familiar with the concepts of securitization and desecuritization. For an introduction to the concepts, see Wæver (1995); for further

- discussion on the evolution of the concept, see Huysmans (1998, 2006) and C.A.S.E. Collective (2006); for discussion of desecuritization see, among others, Aradau (2004).
- 2 Among others, Nussbaum and Cohen (1996), Held (1995), Soysal (1994), Jacobson (1996) Bosniak (2000) Benhabib (2006), Benhabib *et al.* (2007).
  - 3 This, in return, entailed the loss of French citizenship (Weil *et al.* 2010: 6).
  - 4 Brazil, in particular, included in its 1891 Constitution (art. 69) automatic naturalization of all people resident on 15 November 1889, the day on which the Republic was proclaimed. Renunciation within six months was legally allowed, but strongly discouraged by the public authorities (Zincone and Basili 2010: 6).
  - 5 Legomski documents cases in France, Spain, Prussia and other German states, noting that even today certain citizens of such countries as Turkey, Greece or Iran might face a similar situation (Legomski 2003: 89).
  - 6 See, among many others, Noiriel (1996), Favell (1998), Joppke and Morawaska (2003).
  - 7 This expression, attributed to Reinhardt Heydrich, referred to plans to transfer Jews to the French colony of Madagascar, one of many failed plans of territorial deportation (Naimark 2001).
  - 8 By para-citizenship, I refer to all sorts of symbolic documents and cards delivered to emigrants with the purpose of giving them a special status. These include the Person of Indian Origin (PIO) card, Turkey's Pink Card or Croatia's CRO Card.

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