

Governing Diasporas¹

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The study of migration in general and in IR in particular has generally meant the study of *immigration*. Yet, sending states increasingly manage and govern numerically impressive “diasporas” abroad. This article assesses the importance of the government of emigrants and diasporas, and reviews the meager theoretical literature on the topic. It then proposes a theoretical framework based on the concept of governmentality and outlines some avenues for further research.

In 1992, Martin Heisler noted that the discipline of International Relations, at the time dominated by neorealist and neoliberal approaches, was not only uninterested in but also theoretically ill equipped to make sense of the phenomenon of migration. He advocated an “Institutional Political Sociology” approach, drawing on disciplines from across the social sciences (Heisler 1992:599). More than 15 years later, “critical” and “constructivist” scholarship has managed to impose the topic as an important object of research within International Relations, and the newly created journal *International Political Sociology*—the journal of the ISA section of which Martin Heisler was a co-founder—hardly publishes an issue without an article on migration, diasporas or mobility.

This has been made possible thanks to a vast literature that has progressively emerged in the field.² More specifically, the subfield of security studies has served as a privileged theoretical laboratory for the introduction of critical and reflexive methodologies. Yet, the critical engagement with the mainstream or “soft-constructivist” brands of IR has not always been entirely satisfactory. Despite the fact that many of these studies self-identify as “critical,” most of them have not escaped one particular bias: a Eurocentric partiality which makes them bedfellows to the mainstream security studies from which they specifically intend to differentiate themselves (Barkawi and Laffey 2006; Duvall and Varadarajan 2007). To be sure, the risk of critical studies and critical philosophy in general falling into such well-worn biases has already been pointed out (Spivak 1988; Chakrabarty 1992:2)—yet groups like the c.a.s.e. collective have been unable to find a way around the problem.³ Although, like many authors in the critical studies tradition, this collective would probably accept the point in

¹This paper builds on a paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, New York, February 15–18, 2009. The author would like to thank Fiona Adamson for accepting critical intellectual engagement and for providing insightful comments to the initial version of this paper. Thank you also to Myra Waterbury and to the two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments.

²It would be impossible to do justice to the vast literature on the topic, but some of the most influential authors include Roxane Doty on the Mexico-US border (Doty 1996, 1999); the group of critical approaches to security in Europe (Wæver and Buzan 1993; Huysmans 1995; Bigo 2002; c.a.s.e. collective 2006; Van Munster 2009); or studies which have focused on the relationship between migration and citizenship (Soguk 1999; Soguk and Whitehall 1999; Nyers 2003).

³For the c.a.s.e. collective article, see c.a.s.e. collective (2006). For R.B.J. Walker’s critique, see R.B.J. Walker (2007).

principle, it nevertheless has yet to produce any concrete piece of research with this commitment in mind (c.a.s.e. collective 2007). Rather than entering into a critique of the c.a.s.e. collective project, I intend in this article to put into practice the principles established in the collective's 2007 response, using the theoretical tools developed by critical scholars of security in Europe in order to take them "out" of Europe. Indeed, my intention goes one step further: I hope to use these theoretical tools to explore social processes that are not the primary focus of "security studies" but take seriously the project of an "International Political Sociology" (Bigo and Walker 2007).

The aim of this article, then is to investigate a problem that has hardly been addressed by critical scholarship in International Relations: not *immigration*, but *emigration*; and in particular a whole range of state practices orientated toward governing "domestic" populations abroad. While in a small number of western countries policy makers and social scientists are concerned about migrants as those "who arrive," most of the world's governments are more concerned with migrants as those "who leave." In the past 10 years, "diaspora policies" that is policies of states aimed at identifying, gathering, organizing and promoting their "diasporas" has literally burgeoned. Yet as sociologist Abdelmalek Sayad put it, "as an object that has been divided between political powers rather than disciplines, and between divergent social and political interests on continents that have been separated by a frontier that divides emigration and immigration, the migratory phenomenon cannot be fully understood unless science mends the broken threads and puts together the shattered fragments" (Sayad 2004:1).

I intend to address this issue in two steps. First, I present the importance of the phenomenon and the multiplicity of both policy and academic problems that it poses. I will argue that current scholarship on these issues—whether in Anthropology, Sociology, Political Science or International Relations—has not yet asked a very simple yet profoundly disturbing question about these phenomena: how can states durably engage in practices outside of the very territorial boundaries that entitle them to do so? Second, I argue that the evolution of emigration policies, the increasing transnationalization of state practices and the proliferation of the "diasporic" discourse are best understood in relation to the changing modalities and technologies of the "art of government"—or governmentality, namely to the modifications of the state itself. Here, I take cues in particular from the "Paris School"⁴ of security studies in order to elaborate a theoretical framework for the analysis of the formation and evolution of emigration politics, arguing that the diffusion of neo-liberal governmentality as a rationale for and practice of government is the framework in which diaspora policies are best understood. I then conclude with three possible research directions that stem from my analysis.

Making Sense of Diaspora Policies

Diaspora Policies and the Principles of Westphalia

Far from being rendered irrelevant by globalization and migration flows, as has been argued from various theoretical standpoints, empirical research shows that

⁴The term "Paris School" was coined by Ole Wæver to define the group of scholars working around Didier Bigo and the journal *Cultures&Conflicts*. For more on the "Paris School," see c.a.s.e. collective (2006:457). While most studies coincided with the constructivist's attention to discourse analysis, the "Paris School" in particular has linked it to material conditions of emergence, and to particular forms of government. See in particular Bigo (2002). Other scholars from the "Paris School" have drawn attention to the question of governmentality outside immigration (Bonditti 2004), and still other authors inspired by the Paris school have paid attention to processes of transnationalisation of the state, and to modalities of power (Salter 2007).

states themselves are becoming transnational, increasingly reaching out to their populations abroad, severely questioning the traditional understanding of the Westphalian configuration of International Relations.⁵

The institutionalized convention of seeing the international system as a juxtaposition of sovereign states, in which national identities are bounded by territory—the legal fiction that underpins most of international law, that we could define as a “Westphalian vision”—is at the core of IR thinking. For the sake of making IR theory more “manageable,” this tradition has been guilty of at least two analytical conflations. First is the conflation between the “Bodinian” understanding of sovereignty as the power of a ruler over its territory⁶ and the “Vattelian” conception of sovereignty as the principle of non-intervention in other states’ affairs.⁷ The second conflation has been the one between “nation” and “state.” Rather than looking at the processes through which populations and “nations” are being constituted as the legitimate inhabitants of a territory through state-formation processes, mainstream IR theory has taken the category of the “nation-state” as an ahistorical given.⁸ The roots of these conflations run so deep in the discipline that most versions of “mainstream constructivism” and even some “critical approaches” have only with great difficulty departed from this vision.⁹ These two conflations have been the target of much of R.B.J. Walker’s criticism of IR’s traditional vision of states as “an expression of ahistorical essences and structural necessities” (1993:7). While the Westphalian principle and the division of the international might have shadowed diasporas and transnational processes of identification and mobilization for many years, they are now at the forefront of policy preoccupations and academic debates. The relation between states of origins and their populations abroad has in particular gathered increased attention.

Yet, without an analytical framework, a quick glance at the different state practices toward their expatriates gives us a fragmented and chaotic picture of apparently contradictory policies. In terms of economic relations, in some cases, states appear to be “getting rid” of excessive labor; this seems to be the case in the big migrations of the early 20th century from Europe (Green 2005). In others—such as in EU and US guestworker programs—the labor exportation is well planned and organized (Reichert and Massey 1982). In some other cases, states create incentives for their labor abroad to return, such as New Zealand’s “brain drain” policies (Larner 2007). The same apparent contradictions appear at the political level: some states police and even kill their expatriates abroad (Libya, Russia), others use them as “lobbies” and instruments of foreign policy (from Israel to Mexico or Macedonia) (Shain 1989, 1999). In some cases, the population abroad is considered to be a shameful condition (such as Mexico’s “pochos”), in others a resource (Fitzgerald 2006). In some cases, expatriates are denied all rights, in others, they have the right to vote abroad, or even to be represented in parliament

⁵For a review of various cases, see Østergaard-Nielsen (2003a), Waterbury (2008), Gamlen (2008).

⁶In reference to French philosopher Jean Bodin (1530–1596).

⁷This foundational problem of the discipline of International Relations has now been discussed by a large number of authors; see (Bartelson 1995; Caporaso 1989; Onuf 1991; R.B.J. Walker 1993; R.B.J. Walker and Mendlovitz 1990; Weber 1995). For “classic” definitions of sovereignty in the discipline that falls into this trap, see Morgenthau (2006; [1948]:317), Waltz (1979:96), Gilpin (1981:17).

⁸See the debates on “identity” in IR; for a good overview of these debates, see Adamson and Demetriou (2007).

⁹For a very persuasive critique of mainstream constructivism in this regard, see Varadarajan (2004). For a good summary of the discussion surrounding the Copenhagen School (CS) and “identity,” see (c.a.s.e. collective 2006:403–404). See also the absence of reflection on diasporas and transnationalism in c.a.s.e collective (2006:470). For a discussion of the question of “nationalism” and minorities, see the debate between Paul Roe and Matti Jutila (Roe 2004; Jutila 2006).

TABLE 1. Ratios of Populations to Total Claimed Diasporas

<i>State</i>	<i>Total Population</i> ¹⁰	<i>Claimed Diaspora</i> ¹¹	<i>Claimed diaspora to official population ratio (%)</i>
Armenia	3,002,000	5,500,00	183.2
China	1,321,000,000	35,000,000	2.6
Filipines	88,706,300	2,000,000	2.2
Haiti	9,598,000	750,000	7.8
Hungary	10,053,000	4,500,000	44.7
India	1,169,016,000	9,000,000	0.7
Israel	7,208,520	8,000,000	110.9
Italy	59,206,382	8,000,000	13.5
Mexico	106,535,000	20,000,000	18.7
Poland	38,125,479	4,500,000	11.8

(such as in Croatia, Italy or Armenia) (Bauböck 2005). Furthermore, as diachronical comparisons of single cases show, the same states may change from one position to another (such as Mexico or Hungary) (Fitzgerald 2006; Waterbury 2006). The only consensus that emerges from different perspectives in the literature is the current trend of migrant populations to be increasingly re-labeled as “diasporas” or “global nations” and increasingly included in all aspects of social, economic and political life (Cohen 1996; Tölölyan 1996; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Smith 2003a; Brubaker 2005). This phenomenon is numerically important in both absolute and relative terms, as is apparent from Table 1. How to make sense of all these contradictory policies?

Dispersed Theoretical Frameworks

Despite the multiple ways in which government have reached out to their populations abroad in the past and despite the current trend of “diaspora” and “global nation” policies, no convincing theoretical framework has yet been proposed.

Sociologists and anthropologists have been amongst the first to question the traditional “push-pull”¹² approach and take up the issue of transnationalism and state-diaspora relations (Portes 1995; Guarnizo and Smith 1998b). Yet mostly caught up in a Marxian or World-systems approach, their current explanations essentially put forward states’ economic interests and their position in the core/periphery structure as primary explanatory factors. Drawing on this tradition, R.C. Smith proposes a model relying on the “sending state’s relationship to the global system, domestic politics—especially regime change—and migrants’ semi-autonomous ability to make demands on their sending and receiving states” (Smith 2003a:724–725).¹³ Itzighson puts forward more or less the same ideas, adding only the issue of “racial barriers” encountered by migrants (Itzighson 2000). To these converging elements, Levitt and De la Dehesa add “divergent” factors such as political costs and size of constituency as determinants of sending state practices (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003:599). In sum, for these authors, states reach out to their populations and symbolically extend the limits of the nation because it is in their *economic* interest to do so. But why have states with a large emigration such as Mexico, Yugoslavia, Italy, and Ireland first ignored, then embraced their kin abroad? Moreover, how can they explain the result of a systematic study of expatriate citizenship policies on 144 countries

¹⁰Source: United Nations 2007.

¹¹Estimation according to Gabriel Sheffer (2003:104–105).

¹²See Portes and Walton (1981) or Piore (1979).

¹³See also Guarnizo and Smith (1998a).

showing no direct link between economic importance of the diaspora and extension of rights (Collyer and Vathi 2007:20)?

Citizenship studies, including the “critical” ones, have for the most part been unhelpful in answering this question, since broadly speaking they have ignored it. As Barry Hindess commented in 2004, “most academic writings on citizenship focus on developments in a small number of Western states or in the EU...” (Hindess 2004). Only a few authors, such as Rainer Bauböck, have provided detailed accounts of the current modalities of external citizenship and provided normative solutions to the problems they raise. But even these authors have refrained from exploring the reasons underpinning this change: Bauböck here joins sociologists and anthropologists in an instrumental account of the phenomenon such as “human capital upgrading,” remittances or political lobbying (Bauböck 2003:709). Bauböck only briefly mentions broader topics which admittedly would require a good deal more attention: the role of “nationalism” in shaping attitudes toward migrants (Bauböck 2003:710), as well as the roles of “democratization” and reward policies for political exiles, on top of cheap air travel and increasingly easy communication. Although these are mentioned, the proffered explanatory factors remain overwhelmingly instrumental (Bauböck 2005:683).

We should therefore expect political science, and in particular international relations, to have better answers. The literature however has been dominated by approaches mostly stuck in “essentialist” definitions of diasporas,¹⁴ ignoring the constructionist approaches such as those developed previously by Martin Heisler and Barbara Schmitter Heisler (Heisler and Schmitter Heisler 1986; Heisler 1992; Schmitter Heisler 1992). “Mainstream constructivism” in IR has only marginally redressed the essentialist bias: while accepting the constructed nature of diasporas, it nevertheless conceptualizes them as discrete entities—“individuals actors” who may “influence” or “benefit from” interactions with equally essentialized “states” (Shain and Barth 2003:451).¹⁵ For King and Melvin, for example, “basic categories of analysis employed in the study of dispersed ethnic groups—‘homelands’ and ‘diasporas’—are not given and static”; yet these authors evade the question of how, precisely, diasporas are constituted through the symbolic politics of the “sending state;” they thus fall into the classic problem of “groupism.”¹⁶ The existence of “diasporas” on the one hand and “nation-states” on the other is therefore seen as unproblematic (King and Melvin 1999:106–108). Adamson’s approach (2007) is vulnerable to a similar criticism: although this author goes one step further than King and Melvin by acknowledging that “states as institutional structures are still at the centre of current processes of spatial reconfiguration, and that the symbolic importance of both ‘national identity’ and ‘territory’ are not necessarily fading, but are rather being reappropriated and rearticulated through a variety of transnational practices and politics” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007:490), she dismisses critical scholarship’s “conceptual focus on non-state identities” for being “often paired to a political project located within the field of IR, rather than an IR project that seeks to understand the real world of international politics” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007:495). Instead—and ironically—she proposes to go back exactly

¹⁴For essentialist, criteria-based definitions of diasporas, see, among other authors, Gabriel Sheffer (1986, 2003) and William Safran (1991). For exceptions to these dominant approaches in political science and IR, see Østergaard-Nielsen (2001, 2003a,b).

¹⁵For a detailed critique of Yossi Shain and “mainstream constructivism,” see Varadarajan (2005:31–39).

¹⁶According to Brubaker, “a groupist reading conflates groups with the organisations that claim to speak and act in their name; obscures the generally low, though fluctuating degree of ‘groupness’ in this setting, accepts, at least tacitly, the claims of nationalist politicians to speak for the groups they claim to represent, and neglects the everyday contexts in which ethnic and national categories take on meaning and the processes through which ethnicity actually ‘works’ in everyday life” (Brubaker 2007:9).

to what Brubaker argued for abandoning: the use of diaspora as a “category of analysis” (Brubaker 2005).¹⁷

To wit, with a few recent exceptions (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Varadarajan 2005:6; Gray 2006; Larner 2007), most authors working on relations between sending state and diaspora have failed to grasp the foundational problem created by the increasing claims by governments to monopolies of violence, allocation of resources and “national identity” *outside of the very border that entitle them to legitimately do so*. Most scholarly research focuses on documenting the multiple ways in which states reach out to their diasporas, ignoring the inconvenient fact that these ways often challenge our traditional conflation of state, territory and population, or at least failing to provide an adequate explanatory framework as to how to make sense of the facts. As we have seen, explanations focus either on macro-structural elements (globalization, transport, communications), only briefly touching upon the question of governments attitudes and perceptions; or they focus solely on strategic-tactical reasons, interest in remittances, lobbying, etc., failing to explain why now and not before, as well as why is the phenomenon taking place within states for which none of these direct interests is at stake. More generally, although many of these studies understand and acknowledge that these governmental practices question our Westphalian conceptions of the international, most of them still fail to take this into full account, instead relying on “conflated” conceptions of states as territorial states and as national and diasporic identities as “bounded” constructions. It might precisely be in the questioning of these conceptual tools—the “territorial trap” (Agnew 1994) dismissed by Adamson—that we might find clues as to the processes that are taking place.

From Westphalia to Something Else: The Changing Governmentalities of Emigration

The question of the proliferation of sending states’ policies requires a displacement of focus from instrumental questions—*are these policies beneficial? What are the costs?*—to a focus on the evolution of conditions that have rendered these questions relevant. My argument is that the changes both in governmental policies toward their populations abroad and the increasing constitution of these populations as “diasporas” are best understood not only as expedient policies but as the result of broader structural shifts in the “art of government” and in particular in the way the relations between authority, territory and populations are rationalized, organized, practiced and legitimized at the transnational and international levels. In brief, the proliferation of state-led diaspora policies must be understood as a process, as the result of the unequal, heterogeneous, yet increasing spread of “neoliberal governmentality” as a modular deterritorialized rationality and practice of power; and, the discourse of “diaspora” has been an effective performative discourse in the legitimation of this shift.

¹⁷As evidence of Adamson’s uncomfortable position between constructivism and the realist IR tradition, we can quote her *a priori* definition of diaspora, reminiscent of the “categorical” brand of definitions: “A diaspora can be defined as a social collectivity that exists across state borders and that has succeeded over time to (i) sustain a collective national, cultural or religious identity through a sense of internal cohesion and sustained ties with a real or imagined homeland and (ii) display an ability to address the collective interests of members of the social collectivity through a developed internal organisational framework and transnational links” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007:497). On the other hand, this definition is footnoted as follows: “Definitions of ‘diaspora’ have been hotly contested in the literature, making it, like the state, an ‘essentially contested concept’ (Connolly 1974). For examples of definitions of diaspora, see Cohen (1996, 1997); Esman (1986); Safran (1991); Sheffer (1993). We do not attempt to resolve the debate here, but rather survey the existing literature to suggest the contours of what the category of diaspora in IR would include” (Adamson and Demetriou 2007:517).

Rationalities and Practices of Government

How does a theory of the international account for practices of sovereignty that go beyond the territorial borders that legitimize them? In order to explore this question, we have to move away from the juridico-legal conception of power associated to the Westphalian state, finding alternative conceptual tools. Among other critical scholarship in IR, c.a.s.e collective, and especially the contributions of the “Paris school” of security studies have developed useful theoretical insights based on the fruitful crossing of the genealogical method of Michel Foucault with the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu.¹⁸ Researchers associated with the journal *Cultures&Conflits* have followed Foucault’s intellectual project of moving away from the state as a starting point for the conceptualization of power, focusing instead on the various ways through which “the state” as “a practice” has “plugged” itself on different practices of power that operate in society (Bonditti 2004; Foucault 2004:282; Bigo 2006, 2008). These problematizations of the question of “how to govern” are multiple and in constant conflict, and ultimately determine the way in which power operates in different locations in society (Foucault 2004:6). A genealogical methodology therefore starts from an analysis of the different ways in which the problems of government are constituted, the objects of government are categorized through specific modalities of knowledge production, and each category is governed (Bigo 2002).¹⁹ Drawing on and slightly tweaking an article by Stephen Legg (2005:148–149) five entry points or questions for a possible Foucauldian methodology are here outlined as a way of addressing and understanding diasporic policies.

- (1) *Episteme*. What are the broader material (economic crisis, war) and intellectual (nationalism, liberalism) conditions in which a specific problem of government arises? To which specific current problem does a policy relate (fear of depopulation, of overpopulation, of economic decline, etc.)? What are the taken-for-granted assumptions (*doxa* in Bourdieu’s terms) that underpin, channel and point to certain social phenomena as a problem of government? (emigration is helpful, emigration is dangerous, etc.).
- (2) *Knowledge*. Which techniques of knowledge render phenomena *visible* and *manageable*?²⁰ What are the knowledge tools through which populations are classified in discrete, governable entities (maps, census, statistics)?
- (3) *Categorization*. What sort of category of practice is created (émigré, guest-worker, political exile, diaspora), and what specific governmental rationality is attached to it in this context? What is the ideal function that is attributed to this group? (generate wealth, lobby governments, pose a threat).²¹
- (4) *Position of the enunciator*. Which social actors are in material and symbolic struggle for the imposition of their visions, categorizations and functions within a specific category? Are different visions in competition (emigration as a shame vs. emigration as a resource)? How are these competing visions linked to competition at the political or bureaucratic levels? In what ways are these visions ultimately linked to a specific social group within the bureaucratic or political field?

¹⁸See c.a.s.e. collective (2006) and Wæver (2004).

¹⁹In the field of sociology, see also the work of Nikolas Rose and his colleagues: Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde (2006:84).

²⁰See the problematizations of James Scott (1998).

²¹Here we find links with the Copenhagen school and speech act theory.

- (5) *Techné*. Finally, what are the techniques and technologies of government through which these categories of population are governed? What are the modalities through which populations resist the categorizations or functions imposed on them?

Drawing on Foucault, on the “Paris School” and on c.a.s.e, sending states’ diaspora policies can therefore to be analyzed through the lens of the modifications not only in capitalistic economics or short-term interests, but in the ways to which governmental rationalities and the subsequent modalities of power have adapted to these changes. The following section is intended to address the c.a.s.e. collective concern that

a serious study of... cultural practices and their ethical and moral referents, both structured and structuring through the agents’ habitus is still a work in progress. This would engage the “stational” obsession of IR literature, where “national identities” are conceived as objectifiable elements of territorially bound societies. Moreover, it should provide an occasion to test the tools developed by critical approaches to security outside the “Western” world and to abandon euro- and amerocentric agendas of (in)security. (c.a.s.e. collective 2006:448)

Diasporas in the Disciplinary state: Aliyah(s), Exceptionalism, and Cultural Policies

According to Foucault, the “disciplinary” modality of governing territories has roots in the “mercantilist” political economy born in the 16th and 17th centuries, and has given birth to policies essentially destined to territorialize and homogenize populations (Foucault 2004:7). The mercantilist political economy is “more than a simple economic doctrine”: it is a modality of rule of production according to three principles of monetary enrichment of the state, permanent competition with other foreign powers, and strong populationist policies. Mercantilism is in this regard fiercely opposed to emigration (Foucault 2004:46,71). Concurrent with the mercantilist principles, the “disciplinary” moment sees a firm affirmation of the division between the “inside” and “outside” technologies of power, between the police and the army. It is similarly in “disciplinary” moments that projects of national homogenization emerge. It is not by accident that the traditional institutions of “nation-building”—school, factory, and army—are also the institutions pointed out by Foucault as the paradigmatic institutions where the logic of discipline is concentrated (Foucault 1976; Weber and American Council of Learned Societies 1976; Noiriel 1996). In sum, the “disciplinary” modality of government is essentially concerned with territoriality (Foucault 2004:113). While this principle has evolved over time, it has informed a durable number of “emigration policies” at different moments in history.

The disciplinary rationality of government is characterized by the deployment of three consistent relationships with populations abroad, oriented toward the preservation of a clearly bounded territorial state which is understood as the best way to establish security and prosperity. The first relationship, on which the Zionist “Aliyah” is an archetype of, is that of return. These practices of government are rooted understandings of “diaspora” as a pathological form of existence for a nation, a pathology that can only be “cured” by the territorialization of the dispersed populations. This is exemplified in the writings of one of the fathers of Zionism, Leon Pinsker (Pinsker 1947; Marienstras 1985:219). Moreover, when the population is conceptualized as the main resource of the state, “depopulation” becomes a cause for concern, for fear of manpower depletion or depletion of military forces (Green 2005:277). In this configuration, the

“good” member of the nation (the “good Jew,” the “good Albanian,” the “good Armenian”) is the one who goes back home to “build” or “rebuild” his country. Governmental practices under this conception of the diaspora include propaganda for return amongst émigré communities, and the funding of return via financial or tax incentives. Usually eponymous ministries are created to manage the population flow, such as in Israel or in Croatia in the early 1990s (Hockenos 2003:48). Moreover, the concept of *jus sanguinis* can be used to maintain national identity abroad and facilitate return (Green 2005:276).

The second type of relationship in the disciplinary modality of government is the one of simultaneous policy of banning and exporting the security apparatus abroad. One of the correlates of many return policies is indeed to consider whomever leaves, or stays abroad, as at best “suspicious” or at worst a “traitor.” The full actualization of this logic is the creation of the “exile enemy” category in dictatorial states, in which a section of the population abroad is constructed within a Schmittian friend/foe relationship with the government. Zolberg observes that this phenomenon usually takes place within autarchic logics, “particularly in the case of states that seek to catch up by imposing great sacrifices on the current generation” (Zolberg 1989:413). In this relationship categorizations are always polarized, “political exiles” are branded “enemies.” Separatist groups are branded as “terrorists,” as in the case of Turkish practices toward émigré Kurdish organizations (Rigoni 2000) or the treatment by Yugoslavia’s secret police of Serbian and Croat separatist émigrés. Left-wing or right-wing political opposition is automatically “communist” or “fascist”; both these groups become legitimate categories of the population abroad to be surveilled—and sometimes even executed, as in the famous cases of the Moroccan dissenter Ben Barka (Gallissot and Kergoat 1997), the “Bulgarian umbrella” (Kostov 1988), Russian former agent Litvinenko (Goldfarb and Litvinenko 2008), or the 1979 assassination by Khomeiny’s Iran of the Shah’s exiled nephew (Shain 1990:160). In a less spectacular manner, many non-democratic states systematically surveil and track their emigrants as a matter of “inner security” abroad (Cordes 1986). Here, the main governmental techniques are therefore the ban (be it through direct coercion or indirect socio-economic means) and surveillance of populations abroad through a monopolization of the legitimate means of circulation of the population (Torpey 1998), and the exportation of the monopoly of legitimate violence through secret security agencies.

A third relationship is the promotion abroad of an “official national identity” toward “domestic” populations abroad, constructed as “friendly” to the state, through cultural centers and institutes. While British Councils and Alliances Françaises were almost entirely aimed at expanding a colonial culture of “mission civilisatrice,” this was not the case of the policies of the newly founded Germany or Italy. In Germany, for example, the 1889 “All-German School Association” and post-WWI German Academic Exchange (DAAD, founded in 1925) were both conceived as a way to gather the “nation” across borders. Similarly, the Dante Alighierei institutes were famously implemented during the 1920s to spread “national culture” and fascism amongst the emigrant population (Totaro-Genevois 2005:30 quoted in Paschalidis). Similar cultural practices of exportation of “national” culture (or official religion) abroad can be found in many other cases as well, such as those of Turkey (Rigoni 2000) or Russia (Laruelle 2006). These policies are typically “anti-assimilationist” in that they “aim to prevent expatriate or same-language communities from being integrated with foreign states, and to maintain them as potential foreign policy instruments, either in relation to territorial claims or to the procurement of economic and political advantage” (Paschalidis 2008:4). “Friendly” communities abroad are often constructed in opposition to a set of “enemy emigrants.” Yugoslavia, for example, had differentiated policies for the population constituted as the “old

migration” (*stano iseljenistvo*) and the Yugoslav Enemy Migration (*Jugoslavenska Neprijateljska Emigracija*) (Ragazzi 2006). Similarly, in 1955 China marked a strong distinction between overseas Chinese citizens (*huaren*) and overseas ethnic Chinese (*huayi*) (Biao 2003:28). Toward the “friendly” populations, governments deploy(ed) a set of cultural institutions abroad such as cultural centers, schools, or even religious institutions, exporting therefore the monopoly on national, official culture. These policies are, however, traditionally conceived as temporary, and as a means toward the goal of the return of these populations to the homeland—the only other alternative for “normalizing” the situation being territorial annexation.

Whatever the particular interests that governments might address by categorizing populations abroad and drafting and implementing specific policies oriented toward them, these governmental rationalities share the fundamental assumption of the disciplinary form of government, namely the idea that the optimal condition of the political existence is the nation-state. In a sense, these practices of power correspond to a circular topology (that is, of the “spatialization and temporalization of relations of power” (Bigo and Walker 2007:733) of bounded units as the foundation for governmental rationalities. Economic models are based on “national space,” and high tariff barriers. All these projects are destined at reducing mobility, avoiding territorial dispersion and creating and maintaining a clearly bounded and homogeneous “inside” and “outside.” While diasporic connections continue, in this setting usually common to dictatorships, protectionist developmental states or autarchic political ventures, they are judged as negatively, suspicious, and are forced into the private sphere (Schnapper 2001:13).

The Liberal Governmentality and Guestworker Programs

The liberal governmentality originates at the turn of 18th century in the writings of the Physiocrats, arising as a counter-mercantilist understanding of the state and with the goal of limiting its coercive power. Population comes to be conceived not as a collective of “subjects” but as “a set of processes that have to be managed in their naturalness and from their naturalness” through calculation, analysis and reflection on how to “influence” and “take advantage” of them (Foucault 2004:72,74). The liberal governmental rationality, however, still functions through a territorial referent: the target of the government is the “national” population located within a territory. The liberal governmentality can be divided into two historical phases.

The early days of liberal governmentality—which is associated with the Industrial Revolution—saw the emergence of a host of governmental practices characterized as “safety-valve” policies (Hirschman 1978). In the liberal rationality, the problem is not with depopulation, but with overpopulation. In a line of thought born of Malthusianism, the aim of the government is to match the numbers of the population to the resources of the territory; hence the elimination of surplus labor forces becomes necessary. The idea of “shoveling out” the unwanted, such as found in England’s policy toward Irish Catholics in the mid-19th century (Gray 2006), Italy’s policies toward Southerners in the 1910s,²² Japan’s “dumping people” (*Kimin Seisaku*) policies in the first half of the 20th century (Endoh 2000:1) and Cuba’s more recent policies in 1965–1973 and the 1980s²³ are paradigmatic examples of this logic of solving social and political problems by exporting them (Zolberg 1983:33; Green 2005:273). However, two elements often come to modify such “safety-valve” practices over time. First, governments realize

²²Cinell (1991) quoted in Smith (2003a:738).

²³Camarioca and Mariel cite Colomer (2000:435–436).

and come to encourage the potential benefits of a migration that is not “definitive” but “rotatory” in alleviating unemployment and attracting foreign currency. Second, analogously to domestic political struggles, governments come to adopt the logic of *care* developed by a broad range of non-governmental social actors (nationalist and socialist movements, emigrant societies, philanthropists, newspaper editors and religious organizations such as the Scalabrinians or the Franciscans). The government is forced to adopt a “social point of view,” through technologies of social welfare and social insurance (Rose et al. 2006:91).

It is in this context that guestworker programs were imagined for the first time in postwar Europe and in the United States: as a way of engineering a rotational migration, thus tapping into the labor of migratory workers for the purposes of national development, but with the obligation of exporting modalities of long-distance governmental care (Zolberg 1989:408). Guestworker programs involved very large sections of national populations: the Mexican “Bracero Programme” (1942–1964) involved 4 million Mexicans, and the guestworker programs in Europe between 1960 and 1975 involved more than 30 million workers from Italy, Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Algeria, Morocco, Spain, and Portugal (Reichert and Massey 1982:3). Similarly planned programs of “labor exportation” were later set up in other regions, such as the Philippines in the mid-1970s (Gonzalez 1998:119) and China in the mid-1980s (Biao 2003:32). The expected goal for the sending country is always the same: to alleviate unemployment, gain skills abroad and produce foreign currency returns. The official categorizations always explicitly denote the functional identity that is assigned to migrants entering this modality of government, as “workers” and as “temporarily abroad”: for example, such workers were called “Workers Temporarily Employed Abroad” in Yugoslavia (Baucic 1975) and “Braceros” in Mexico (Gonzalez 1998:119). In terms of practices of power—at least for those who came to Europe—these programs govern emigrants not so much through disciplinary practices of policing so much as through the typical welfare technology of insurance (Ewald 1986). Through a vast array of bilateral agreements, guestworkers are in fact caught up in various programs of healthcare, social help and pensions that become modalities of “conduct of conducts,” the main goal being to keep the populations in circulation; this is exemplified by the cases of Turkey and Yugoslavia (Paine 1974; Zimmerman 1987). Recent Chinese emigration agencies go as far as to provide “information about emigration prospects, helping with passport and visa applications, establishing connections with the destination countries... some offer settlement services in the destination country such as registering for medical insurance, obtaining driving licenses, opening bank accounts, and providing English language training” (Biao 2003:35). But governmental plans are always prone to fail. For Foucault, the main dichotomy for the liberal governmentality is that between the “population” and the “populace”—that is “those who do not behave rationally according to the calculus planned for the population” (Foucault 2004:46); in this case, the “populace” is the “temporary migrant” who ceases to circulate and becomes a “permanent migrant.” This phenomenon was not anticipated by policy makers in Europe or in the United States, but ultimately came to prominence through the sheer number of “braceros” and “guestworkers” who became permanent immigrants.

Guestworker programs are therefore possible of course in the context of precise configurations in the world system, and they are driven by the short-term interests of governments in harnessing economic gains through the circulation of sections of the population into the international division of labor. More importantly, however, these programs are made possible by a deeper shift in the rationalities of power, and in particular the passage from a sovereign modality of government obsessed with governing a territorialized population to a liberal governmentality in which a derogation of the territorial model is possible, with

the condition that it be temporary. Yet, as the profusion, in the home countries, of pejorative folk terms designating labor emigrants will testify to—"Nuyoricans" (Puerto Rico), "Gastići" (Yugoslavia), ABCDs²⁴ (India), "Pochos" (Mexico), "Jook-sing" (China), "Yordim" (Israel)—emigration in the liberal governmentality is still considered as suspicious, as deviating from the territorialized, "domestic" existence. While the practice of power suggests a different topology, the imaginary remains bounded to the territorial state.

The Neo-Liberal Moment, Toward A Diasporic Governmentality?

But the current state of affairs also departs significantly from the liberal or welfare-liberal conditions in which guestworker programs originated. This is not to say that the previous rationalities are not being currently deployed—some governments still have predominantly disciplinary stances, while others still today push active welfarist liberal programs—yet the overall decline of the welfare state and the failure of socialist economies have given rise to the progressive diffusion of what is commonly called a neo-liberal or "advanced liberal" form of governmentality, intended not only as an economic doctrine, but as a form of government (Barry, Osborne, and Rose 1993; Rose 1999). Two important changes have come about with this new political economy which describes itself as political. First, the economic frame of reference for what it is to be governed is no longer thought of purely in terms of national territories; that is, competition is no longer predominantly international, but local, regional and transnational. Hence policies oriented toward providing welfare are progressively dismantled and become segmented in service to particular professional sectors, geographic locales or types of activity. Second, the "advanced liberal" political economy brings about the idea that individuals are no longer to be passively and collectively governed through the impersonal figure of the state (through health care, social security, etc.) but that instead they should be active in their own government. Forms of allegiance and responsibilities are therefore oriented toward the local, and circles of solidarity are increasingly located in the community. By defining this process as the "the death of the social," Nikolas Rose remarked that "such virtual communities are 'diasporic;' they exist only to the extent that their constituents are linked together through identifications constructed in the non-geographic spaces of activist discourses, cultural products and media images" (Rose 1996:333).


This is the framework in which "diaspora" or "global nation" policies emerge: first, they are a displacement of the legitimate object of government from populations within a territory ("the social") to populations irrespective of their physical territorial location, according to new criteria of inclusion and exclusion ("the community"). Second, these policies are not concerned with population return or territorial expansion, as in the disciplinary moment, nor with circulation, as in the liberal moment; rather, they are primarily concerned with dispersion as a resource and a legitimate modality of political existence. This takes place at several levels.

The first level is that of symbolic politics. Groups abroad previously categorized separately as "immigrants," "refugees," "political exiles," and "guestworkers" are now being re-labeled as "diasporas" or "global nations" or "nations abroad," and sending states have actively participated in these symbolic politics (Schnapper 2001; Smith 2003a:728; Brubaker 2005). The terms "diaspora" and "global nation" imply a remapping of the boundaries of belonging, and constitute a new dichotomy between the "included" and the "excluded" which is independent of territorial considerations. The new official identities—even

²⁴American Born Confused Indian.

though they have been the result of a long process of “nationalization”—are exported and repackaged in essentialist terms, as the examples of “italianità” (Italianness), “magyarság” (Hungarian-ness) or “mexicanidad” (Mexican-ness) demonstrate (Gonzalez Gutierrez 1999:546; M.A. Waterbury 2008:5). Previously pejorative terms become the object of stigma reversals—such as the valorization of the “pochos” by the Programme for Mexican Communities Abroad (Smith 2003a:728). Heads of states now embrace populations that were previously forgotten. While Zionism was based on a negation of the diasporic existence, Ariel Sharon more recently announced that he understood his mandate as unifying not only Israel but “Jews worldwide” (Shain and Bristman 2002:77); Mexico’s president Vicente Fox announced in 2000 that he would “govern on behalf of 118 million Mexicans”—18 million of which are living in the United States (Varadarajan 2005:1); and Mary Robinson declared that she was the prime minister of Irish everywhere in the world (Gray 2006:360–361). These symbolic policies take various other forms, such as large conferences and congresses (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a) or national “diaspora” days like the “Pravasi Bharatiya Diwas” in India (Jaffrelot and Therwath 2007:293).

Second, diasporas are increasingly becoming a specific “state category.” This has translated into administrative modifications of sending states, and a multiplication of “diaspora” ministries and agencies; be it the “Ministry of Diaspora” in Serbia or in Armenia, the “Institute for Mexicans Abroad” in Mexico, the “Irish Abroad Unit” in Ireland, the Ministry of Italians Abroad in Italy, the “Commission on Filipinos Overseas” (Gonzalez 1998:120), the “Overseas Employment Office” in China (Biao 2003:33) and a broad range of “diaspora” ministries across the middle east and Africa (Gamlen 2008:8). Moreover, specific legal status and identification documents are often given to expatriates—Non-resident Indians (NRI) and Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) in India for example (Jaffrelot and Therwath 2007) or “Matricula Consular” in Mexico. Similar types of status exist in Argentina, Colombia, Salvador, Honduras, Peru, Morocco, Pakistan and Turkey (Lomeli-Azoubel 2002; Gamlen 2008).



Third, in addition to long-distance practices of “labor management,” “cultural inculcation” and political **policing, sending states are increasingly requiring that their populations abroad act as “lobbyists” and extensions of the state’s foreign policy.** This has famously been the case of Israel, but is proliferating in other countries such as Mexico, Croatia, Eritrea, Greece, or Macedonia (Skrbiš 1999; Shain and Bristman 2002:79–80; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Smith 2003b). Similarly, “diaspora politics” justify what was previously labeled as “kin-state politics” or “proxy-politics,” in which ethnic minorities of neighboring states are instrumentalized by their “homelands,” such as in the examples of Hungary and Romania over Transylvania, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina over Herzegovina, or Russia toward its minorities abroad (King and Melvin 1999; Laruelle 2006; Waterbury 2006; Ragazzi 2008). In return, and as the result of political struggle, populations abroad have increasingly obtained dual citizenship, voting rights, and even the right to hold public office and have dedicated representation in parliaments (Faist 2001; Bauböck 2005). Practices of citizenship, in many instances, have, however, had little to do with populations abroad, and have been used as techniques of domestic ethnic engineering to exclude minority groups, in the name of the inclusion of the “majority” abroad.

Everything therefore happens as if the neo-liberal production of community “as a logic of governing that migrates and is selectively taken up in diverse political contexts” (Ong 2007:3) created communitarianism in immigration contexts and forms of “diasporic governmentality” in emigration contexts. But these appear as the two sides of the same coin: a shift in the criteria of belonging from territorial criteria to criteria of race, religion or “ethnicity” (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999; Skrbiš 1999). Recent studies have pointed out the “transnational

nationalism” as a new version of the traditional “ethnic nationalism” (Kastoryano 2006). Drawing on these debates in nationalism studies, it could be argued that the “diasporic nationalism” is the form of nationalism that corresponds to the globalized and transnational neoliberal modality of government. Twentieth century projects of national homogenization or even annexation—characteristic of the disciplinary state—are abandoned as too costly. Instead, the new boundaries of government draw, reinforce, and reinvent previous demarcations, namely “communities.” Citizenship and the criteria of belonging become the new exclusionary criteria. This goes hand in hand with the legitimation of transnational politics. While in the two previous moments the nation-state model remained the referent despite transnational governmental practices, in the neo-liberal moment the diasporic condition is legitimized and normalized. Dispersion is considered as an economic and political resource: economically through the constant flow of remittances, and politically through the claim of channeling political lobbying. What Didier Bigo outlined for the government of *immigration* holds true for the government of *émigration*:

Topology of security in democracies is no longer the elegant cylinder, but a complicated form, the Klein bottle. The opening of sovereign borders destroys the security construct of a homogeneous society.... In this case, freedom is limited by a new security device: monitoring of minorities and of diasporas. Identity fences replace territorial fences. While people are allowed to move, their identities must be constructed and controlled. To achieve this Klein bottle process, people need to be reduced to the states of a herd that has only the right to bread and circuses. However, this fails to take account of the social practices of resistance and of indifference.... This transnational program will fail when governments try to enforce it. (Bigo 2001:115)

Conclusion: Research Directions

As Aihwa Ong remarked vis-à-vis the industrializing states in Southeast Asia: “Rather than accept claims about the end of sovereignty, we need to explore mutations in the ways in which localized political and social organization set the terms and are constitutive of a domain of social existence” (Ong 2003:40). I hope to have shown that while governmental practices toward “their” populations abroad can be contradictory and confused, they can be made more intelligible through an understanding of the broader material, intellectual, and political contexts in which they emerge, and in particular the governmental rationality that underpins them. The contemporary proliferation of the diasporic discourse and the social and political struggles that are associated with it must be understood primarily as political processes that ultimately seek to legitimize a radical shift in the way governments organize the relationships between power and territory, a shift which deeply questions the traditional Westphalian principle of territoriality. By moving away from juridico-legal conceptions of sovereignty, one can better understand the evolution of the processes of “transnationalization” of governmental practices. The discourse of diaspora therefore seems to go hand in hand with the transnationalization of power that is underpinned by the neoliberal agenda, described by others as the “death of the social” and the rising of “government through communities” (Rose 1996).

But the different logics I have outlined here are not intended as historical serializations or as a teleological conception of the evolution of governmentality; instead, they must be understood as a heterogeneous set of rationalizations and practices of power that emerge and become dominant in determinate political and historical contexts. This does not mean that the previous rationalities and

practices disappear (Foucault 2004:109). More often than not, governments in fact go back and forth between one form of rationality and the other. Very often multiple rationalities coexist and overlap in different bureaucracies, struggling with one another even within the same state. Governmental practices are therefore not the result of a “national interest,” but rather of the domination of a principle of vision within the bureaucratic and political field.

It seems clear, then, that this article is just scratching the surface of a phenomenon that is in need of a good deal of further research. It is still left to be explained how, within domestic bureaucratic struggles, transnational networks of migration and security professionals, and international organizations such as the OECD, the ILO, the UN, the UNDP, the World Bank and now the EU, we have passed from one rationality to the other. The modalities of change are in fact not mere “discursive shifts,” but very concrete social and political struggles that are located in specific institutions. Drawing on the approach of the Paris school toward the sociology of the “professionals of (in)security” as well as other scholars who have mapped transnational networks (for example, see Dezalay and Garth 2001), a thorough analysis of the “ideologies of migration” and the practical effects they have produced could be a fruitful avenue for research.

A second possible avenue for research arises from the fact that governmental programs are not “diagrams.” Practices of power fail to meet their planned objective: they nearly always encounter resistance, bringing new rationalizations and new practices. Comparisons across history and across cases are still needed to map the “diagram” of these governmental practices: In which precise locales are they connected to broader principles of neoliberalization of the state? How persistent are the old practices? Which agencies are involved? What are the specific discursive and non-discursive techniques and modalities through which practices are exported and exerted? Similarly, detailed comparisons are needed to map the new categorizations that are emerging, and the way in which new “functions” and “responsibilities” are attributed to these new categories.

Finally, scholarship needs to take stock of the current “counter-conduct” that is emerging as a response to the neoliberal diasporic governmentality. First, an element that has been willingly left out of the article are the practices of resistance and subjectivities that arise from diasporic organizations and institutions. While diasporic institutions and subjects have been presented here only in the light of the practices of power they are subjected to, every analysis of governmental diaspora policies need to take into account the counter-practices enacted by these social actors. This again requires a detailed empirical study, as these practices can be the development of alternative narratives or instead the appropriation and reinforcement of the governmental practices they are subjected to. Second, as is often the case, the most effective resistance comes from within the structures of power: what are the alternative conceptions of belonging and citizenship that are being articulated in, for example, the Council of Europe as opposed to the ones in the European Commission? UNESCO as opposed to World Bank? Although this is already in progress to a certain extent, more studies ought to take into account the formulations of belonging that question the deterritorialized exclusionary boundary-making process of diasporic policies and establish other principles that take into consideration the new structures imposed by globalization processes (Faist 2000; Bauböck 2005:685–686). What forms do they take, in which structural conditions do they evolve, and what resources can be mobilized?

This research promises to revisit the fundamental questions posed by critical scholarship about the untangling of “identities, borders and orders” (Albert, Jacobson, Lapid, and Group Identities Borders Orders 2001) the “territorial trap” (Agnew 1994) and formulate alternative topologies to imagine and conceptualize

the international, such as the Moëbius ribbon proposed by Bigo and Walker (2001) from an unexpected angle for IR theory.

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